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BLANK SLATES 
MATTHEW TOKSON* 
Abstract: Courts sometimes confront gaps in formal law where doctrinal sources 
like text, history, and precedent fail to offer guidance in resolving a particular 
case. When these gaps are narrow, judges can generally address them through 
analogical reasoning or intuition. But sometimes legal gaps are too substantial to 
be filled with one-off decisions, and judges are called upon to create whole legal 
tests without the benefit of formal guidance or constraint. Courts currently lack a 
theoretical framework for addressing these difficult situations. This Article ana-
lyzes these “legal blank slates” and provides a framework for addressing them. 
Blank slates are less common than other types of legal indeterminacy, like inter-
pretive controversies, institutional conflicts, and narrow formal gaps. But they 
arise fairly regularly and often involve important legal issues. This Article sur-
veys examples of legal blank slates in areas like Fourth Amendment law, free 
speech, the dormant Commerce Clause, and anti-discrimination law, and draws 
lessons for a general theory of blank slates. This Article also offers several strate-
gies that courts might use to effectively address blank slates and develops a 
framework for choosing the best approach for a given situation. Ultimately, blank 
slate theory can shed light on concrete doctrinal questions as well as broader de-
bates about legal interpretation. It can, for example, suggest a new approach for 
determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope and help explain why previous 
Fourth Amendment regimes have been unsuccessful. More generally, the theory 
can provide a unique perspective on interpretive debates, using the extreme case 
of blank slates to gain fresh insights into legal interpretation as a whole. 
INTRODUCTION 
Indeterminacy can be found in every area of law. The application of a 
general legal rule to a particular case is often unclear. Formal sources of law 
may conflict with each other, as may constitutional values, or branches of 
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government. And legal regimes may leave gaps where doctrinal sources like 
text, history, or precedent fail to offer guidance in resolving a particular ques-
tion. 
Judges often fill narrow gaps in law by reasoning from analogous prece-
dents or relying on their intuitions about which outcome is fairest or best.1 
But some legal gaps are too substantial to be addressed with a one-off judicial 
decision. Some cases may, for instance, present legal questions that require 
courts to define a concept or create a test that potentially covers a broad range 
of conduct.2 In these situations, courts are compelled to develop a standard to 
guide future decision-making, but must do so in the absence of formal guid-
ance or constraint. Scholars currently lack a concrete theory of how courts 
should proceed in such situations. 
This Article’s primary aim is to develop such a theory. It begins by iden-
tifying and exploring the concept of legal blank slates (“blank slates”). Blank 
slates are legal gaps that require a test or standard to resolve. A legal blank 
slate involves 1) a legal question that calls for the promulgation of a test or 
standard, and 2) the absence of useful formal guidance for courts in shaping 
such a test or standard. Although blank slates are less common than other 
types of legal indeterminacy, they occur fairly regularly and often involve 
important legal issues. 
For example, one of the most difficult questions in constitutional law 
concerns the scope of the Fourth Amendment. For decades, courts have 
struggled to define the concept of a Fourth Amendment “search,”3 adopting 
various standards only to later reject or modify them when they fail to pro-
duce coherent answers.4 Indeed, the failures of current Fourth Amendment 
law might prompt scholars to reexamine the text, history, and purpose of the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 82–83, 106–08 (2008); JOSEPH RAZ, 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 195–97 (1979). Judges might also fill certain gaps by applying extra-
legal default rules. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 520–23 (2013).  
 2 See infra notes 25–82 and accompanying text. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment is limited to tangible things); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (declaring that 
the Fourth Amendment’s scope is not based on physical intrusion but is determined by expecta-
tions of privacy); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment’s scope is also determined by trespass concepts); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) 
(abandoning the trespass concept for a concept based on physical touching and social norms); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507–22 
(2007) (describing how courts have departed from the Katz standard in a variety of ways, creating 
multiple competing tests for Fourth Amendment scope); infra notes 281–308 and accompanying 
text. 
594 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:591 
 
Amendment, in the hopes of discovering a more effective standard for Fourth 
Amendment “search.” 
Yet in doing so, one only encounters a deeper mystery. Formal sources 
of law offer virtually no guidance on the scope of Fourth Amendment 
“search.” The text of the Fourth Amendment does not define a “search,” ex-
ternal sources give vague and conflicting definitions, and in context, the term 
has a vast spectrum of potential meanings ranging from any gathering of in-
formation to the physical inspection of a particular place.5 The drafting and 
ratification histories of the Amendment are silent on the issue.6 In general, 
history reveals scarcely more than that the physical inspection of a house is a 
search—a wholly uncontroversial proposition that sheds little light on modern 
search questions.7 Moreover, what little information there is about the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment is too vague and abstract to dictate which 
government actions constitute a “search.”8 In short, formal law is essentially 
silent on the issue, yet judges are compelled to set some standards to guide 
future courts and other legal actors. Courts seeking to move beyond the con-
fusion of current Fourth Amendment law are left with a blank slate. 
This Article examines the blank slate of the Fourth Amendment’s scope, 
and surveys other important blank slates in areas like free speech, the 
dormant Commerce Clause, and anti-discrimination law.9 It evaluates how 
courts have confronted these difficult issues and draws lessons from these 
case studies for blank slate theory.10 
This Article analyzes several potential approaches to blank slates. Like 
most difficult legal or policy questions, blank slates tend to involve a balance 
of competing considerations.11 The various strategies for resolving blank 
slates can be distinguished by how the strategies address this underlying bal-
ance. For instance, a court might engage in direct normative balancing, creat-
ing a test that encompasses important considerations on each side of an issue 
and weighs them against each other. Courts have used this approach when 
addressing issues like content-neutral speech restrictions and government 
employee speech in First Amendment law.12 Alternatively, a court might use a 
proxy standard that is meant to capture key elements of the underlying nor-
mative balance but is generally easier for courts to apply. For example, such a 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See infra notes 221–253 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 162–337 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 162–337 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 91–107 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
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standard has long been used to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope.13 Last-
ly, a court might elect not to choose any of these strategies and decline to give 
an explanation for its decision in the hopes that a future decision-maker with 
more information or institutional capacity will do a better job.14 
This Article offers a meta-theory to help determine which of these strat-
egies is optimal for a given situation. In general, the best strategy will vary 
based on the characteristics of the blank slate at issue. For instance, the more 
complex, broad, or unstable the blank slate, the more likely it is that direct 
balancing will be the optimal approach.15 By contrast, narrower blank slates 
or those that raise issues on which there is little empirical data are more likely 
to be effectively addressed by proxy standards.16 This Article examines these 
and other factors and develops a detailed framework to help guide courts con-
fronting blank slates. 
Blank slate theory has implications for both concrete doctrinal questions 
and broader debates about legal interpretation. It can be used to evaluate 
courts’ current approaches to blank slates and to help devise new, more effec-
tive legal tests. If existing law employs a balancing test where a proxy is like-
ly to perform better, or vice versa, that can be a powerful argument in favor of 
doctrinal change. 
The theory can, for example, help point the way towards an optimal re-
gime for determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Government surveil-
lance presents complex legal and policy issues and encompasses a wide varie-
ty of government activities. The technological and social context of govern-
ment surveillance is also especially unstable, and Fourth Amendment proxy 
standards have a history of being disrupted by new technologies. Moreover, 
obtaining relevant information about privacy harms, chilling effects, and the 
effectiveness of law enforcement is gradually becoming easier.17 Overall, 
blank slate theory suggests that some form of a balancing test is likely to be 
the optimal approach for handling Fourth Amendment search.18 Although an 
effective proxy test might someday be devised, none currently exists, and 
none is likely to emerge. 
Blank slate theory can also contribute to broader debates about legal in-
terpretation and suggest improvements to both formalist and non-formalist 
interpretive theories. It offers a unique perspective on interpretive debates 
because blank slates function largely outside of these debates, existing only 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 108–114 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 115–124 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 128–147 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 128–147 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 343–358 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 343–358 and accompanying text. 
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when formal sources are unavailable to guide or constrain interpretation. 
Blank slate theory can improve non-formalist theories by providing specific 
direction to courts in reaching optimal outcomes or fashioning legal regimes 
that fit best with the broader justifications behind a body of law. It can also 
refine formalist theories, many of which acknowledge the possibility of legal 
gaps, by identifying significant gaps in formal regimes and offering a norma-
tively appealing method for resolving them.19 
In fact, blank slate theory can contribute to interpretive theories even in 
situations where formal law is relatively clear. The theory can help courts 
concerned with maximizing utility negotiate the trade-off between the institu-
tional and epistemic benefits of formal law and the costs of applying flawed 
tests. Under more formal approaches, blank slate theory can help determine 
when a statutory test is unworkable and should be repealed, or when courts 
should apply a precedent narrowly rather than expanding its reach. Moreover, 
when doctrinal sources provide only slight or ambiguous guidance, the theory 
can bolster formal approaches and aid courts in construing under-determinate 
laws. 
The following discussion proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines the con-
cept of blank slates in detail.20 Part II offers a theory of how courts can opti-
mally address blank slates.21 Part III surveys examples of blank slates, evalu-
ates how courts have responded to them, and draws lessons for blank slate 
theory in general.22 Part IV applies blank slate theory to the question of 
Fourth Amendment “search,” explores the implications of the theory for legal 
interpretation in general, and examines how the theory can contribute to the 
rulification and legal change literature.23 
I. DEFINING LEGAL BLANK SLATES 
Difficult questions abound in law, particularly in the subset of legal con-
flicts that result in a written judicial opinion. A legal question may be difficult 
because formal sources of law point in different directions, or because policy 
considerations are in tension with existing formal law. It is often hard to de-
termine how an abstract legal proposition should apply to a given case. Re-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079, 1131, 1146–47 (2017); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal 
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985); Solum, supra note 1, at 471. 
 20 See infra notes 24–82 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 83–161 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 162–337 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 338–392 and accompanying text. “Rulification” refers to the process in 
which courts applying a standard promulgate sub-rules to address particular situations. 
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solving clashes between the federal government and the states or between co-
equal branches of government is especially challenging. These situations can 
present courts with difficult and uncertain questions of interpretation, judg-
ment, or policy. But these are not what I mean by “blank slates.” 
A blank slate refers not to any situation of legal uncertainty, but to broad 
questions of law for which there is minimal formal guidance. This Part offers 
a definition of legal blank slates and an account of how they arise.24 
A. The Spectrum of Legal Determinacy 
Blank slates are extreme cases, existing at the far edge of the spectrum 
of legal determinacy. This section examines the spectrum of legal determina-
cy, from clear applications of law on the one end to blank slates on the oppo-
site end. 
In law and legal scholarship, observers pay the most attention to persis-
tent legal controversies, those in which the meanings of laws are disputed. 
The vast majority of legal rules and applications, however, are uncontrover-
sial and clear. We know to stop at stop signs, to avoid committing a vast cata-
log of crimes and civil offenses, and to pay our taxes by April 15th.25 We also 
know that a U.S. president must be at least thirty-five years of age, that the 
government cannot impose prior restraints on the press, and that persons ac-
cused of a crime have the right to a jury trial.26 Even the legal questions in-
volved in trial litigation are frequently uncontested or have determinate an-
swers, and the overwhelming majority of cases in the federal courts of ap-
peals elicit no dissent, albeit for a variety of reasons.27 
Then there is the vast arena of legal controversy, where lawyers use var-
ious theories of interpretation and construction to answer difficult legal ques-
tions. In these situations, text, context, general history, legislative history, in-
tent, precedent, and/or policy considerations may conflict. Judges resolve 
such disputes by assessing which side has the most compelling interpretive 
argument, and many judges have systemic preferences for certain interpretive 
methods.28  
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 25–81 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theo-
ries of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1298 (2015). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.; Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1331 (2009); see also The Sta-
tistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401, 406 (2014) (reporting that roughly sixty-four percent of Supreme 
Court cases in the 2013 were unanimous, if opinions with a concurrence are included). 
 28 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 92. Thus, an originalist judge may prefer text and history to 
precedent and policy consequences, whereas a common-law constitutionalist might have the oppo-
site preference. Id. 
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For instance, the meaning of the Second Amendment prior to the Court’s 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller29 was an especially controversial 
and difficult question.30 Yet it was not a blank slate in terms of formal law. 
Different sides of the dispute offered competing textual and/or historical in-
terpretations of the Amendment, many of which yielded answers that clashed 
with those established by longstanding precedent.31 The Court had to analyze 
these competing sources of formal law, weigh (or decline to weigh) them 
against extra-formal policy considerations, and choose among the various 
competing historical, textual, precedential, and other interpretations to reach a 
definitive interpretation and a corresponding outcome.32 The formal sources 
were conflicting and ambiguous, but they ultimately yielded a final answer. 
Relatedly, in constitutional law, there are areas where two or more con-
stitutional values conflict, and courts must either reconcile them or choose 
which value will predominate.33 Courts might resolve these cases on any 
number of grounds, often by considering which principle more directly gov-
erns the dispute, which was most recently enacted, or which serves more im-
portant or fundamental values.34 Similarly, for separation of powers and fed-
eralism issues, courts may be called upon to resolve conflicts between differ-
ent branches of government, or between the federal government and the 
states.35 Courts can generally draw on sources like text, historical practice, 
and precedent to resolve conflicts between institutions, although these sources 
likely offer less guidance than in the typical case. Systemic preferences as to 
methods of interpretation, as well as political or institutional preferences, are 
likely to play a prominent role. 
                                                                                                                           
 29 554 U.S. 570, 723 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to possess a firearm regardless of whether that individual is serving in a militia). 
 30 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END 
THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007) (discussing two general competing interpretations of the Second 
Amendment; an originalist view that favors individual rights to gun-ownership, and the more 
traditional interpretation, which supports a view of gun-ownership as a collective right that toler-
ates greater government intervention). 
 31 See generally United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (finding that the Second 
Amendment applies only to state militias). 
 32 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–634 (engaging in textual, historical, and comparative analysis 
and rejecting competing views based on alternative readings of the text, policy interests, the draft-
ing history of the Second Amendment, and United States v. Miller). 
 33 See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (highlighting a divide 
between Thirteenth Amendment principles of equality and structural principles of private autono-
my); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (analyzing property rights that were in conflict with 
free speech rights); Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1022, 1029–32 (1978). 
 34 See Henkin, supra note 33, at 1031–32. 
 35 Id. at 1032–37; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–13 (1974) (discussing 
the President’s privilege and its limitations notwithstanding the doctrine of separation of powers). 
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Then there are legal scenarios that offer even less formal determinacy 
than those described above. For instance, courts are often asked to apply 
broad legal rules to specific, unique disputes. It is often unclear, however, 
whether such broad rules apply to unique situations beyond the central do-
main of the rule.36 In most of these situations, courts can seek at least partial 
guidance from relevant precedents, widely accepted canons of construction, 
or historical analogues.37 For example, a court might construe the broad con-
cept of “negligence” in tort law by examining cases where similar conduct 
was considered to be negligent.38 Or a court might construe the vague term 
“prospectus” in one provision of a statute by giving it the same meaning that 
it has in a different provision of the same statute.39 In these cases, formal 
sources may direct courts to a particular construction of vague texts or broad 
legal principles. 
Finally, there are legal questions for which existing formal sources do 
not provide any meaningful answers. Any legal regime, be it constitutional, 
statutory, or common law, will inevitably leave doctrinal gaps that judges 
must fill in the course of resolving disputes.40 Legal theorists have disputed 
whether these formally indeterminate legal questions have “right” answers in 
terms of normative consistency, morality, and fit with the overall structure 
and narrative of law.41 These debates are largely tangential to the present dis-
cussion of formal indeterminacy.  
In discussing “legal gaps,” I refer simply to legal questions on which 
traditional doctrinal sources (text, history, precedent, etc.) fail to provide use-
ful guidance. Even proponents of the right answer thesis, like Ronald 
Dworkin, concede that some cases will be indeterminate in terms of doctrinal 
evidence.42 Their point is that these cases can be said to have a right answer 
                                                                                                                           
 36 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126–27 (3d ed. 2012). 
 37 See id.; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 295 (2017). 
 38 See, e.g., Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 638 (Kan. 1989) (addressing a novel question 
of comparative negligence via analogy to similar cases); Hayes v. Iworx, Inc., No. CV-06-168, 
2006 WL 2959702, at *3 (Super. Ct. Me. July 31, 2006) (resolving a novel negligent representa-
tion question on the basis of an analogy to fraudulent representation law). 
 39 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1995). 
 40 See Merrill, supra note 19, at 33. Even formalist theorists acknowledge the existence of 
legal gaps. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 19, at 1131, 1146–47 (discussing cases that cannot be 
resolved using interpretive rules and noting the residual indeterminacy that can persist even after 
one adopts originalist methods of constructing law from ambiguous texts); Solum, supra note 1, at 
471 (acknowledging constitutional gaps where the constitutional text requires the existence of a 
rule of constitutional law but fails to provide that rule’s content). 
 41 Compare RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 138, 142, 161 (1985) (contending 
that every legal question has a best answer in the broader normative sense), with RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197–203 (1990) (contending that many legal ques-
tions have no correct answer). 
 42 DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 134–40, 142. 
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based on moral or other considerations, even though the correctness of the 
answer is not “demonstrable” in terms of formal law.43 On the Dworkinian 
view, principles of morality and integrity are no less “legal” than doctrinal 
sources like text and precedent.44 This Article does not take a position on 
these issues, except to clarify that the concept of blank slates refers to an ab-
sence of doctrinal guidance. Cases presenting doctrinal blank slates might 
nonetheless have correct legal answers in terms of morality or other princi-
ples. Indeed, the theory of blank slates offered below may assist judges in 
fashioning legal tests that fit best with existing legal structures and their nor-
mative justifications, and thus help judges formulate the “correct” test despite 
the absence of traditional formal guidance.45 
Legal gaps can arise in a variety of doctrinal regimes. In the common 
law context, courts often confront gaps when faced with questions of first 
impression. In wholly unique cases, judges may rely on their intuition about 
which outcome is best or most equitable.46 Usually, however, these questions 
are sufficiently related to those resolved in previous cases that courts can 
draw non-determinative but helpful analogies.47 Courts deciding novel cases 
often consider competing analogies or frameworks and choose the one that 
seems most closely related to the current situation.48 A sophisticated judge 
may decide a new case by discerning the unstated rationales of previous cases 
and using them to reach the optimal outcome.49 This process of comparison 
and analogy to previous cases is at the core of the common law, “a system 
built up by gradual accretion of special instances.”50 
Constitutional provisions are often abstract and broad, leaving gaps for 
courts to fill when they decide particular cases. For instance, a general consti-
tutional principle may be wholly indeterminate when applied to a specific 
situation.51 Some provisions are only partially determinate, ruling out some 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. at 142. 
 44 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–27 (1986). 
 45 See infra notes 84–161 and accompanying text. 
 46 POSNER, supra note 1, at 106–08; see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 
(2010). 
 47 See Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 
(1936) (describing how paradigm common law decisions are narrow, results-focused, and based 
on analogy, and noting that general rules or principles in the common law typically only emerge 
as related precedents accumulate over time). 
 48 POSNER, supra note 1, at 180–81. 
 49 Id. at 180–83 (describing an instance where a court held that steamboat operators owe a 
high duty of care to protect their guests from theft because a steamboat stateroom is more analo-
gous to a hotel room, where the hotel can efficiently prevent theft, than to an open railroad berth, 
where theft is harder to prevent and more responsibility must fall on the passenger). 
 50 Stone, supra note 47, at 6. 
 51 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 8 (1999). 
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results but still permitting a variety of outcomes.52 Courts might fill these 
gaps by using extra-constitutional default rules,53 reasoning from analogous 
constitutional precedents,54 or relying on their intuitions regarding the best 
outcome for a particular case.55 
Gaps in statutes arise because it is generally impossible for a statutory 
scheme to provide a rule for every eventuality or to anticipate every potential 
application of a rule.56 Courts are often called upon to fill these gaps, in a 
process similar to addressing new questions in a common law system. When 
filling relatively narrow statutory gaps, courts can sometimes look to the ob-
jectives of the statute or to the broader statutory structure. Judges can then 
select an outcome that best comports with the rest of the statute and effectu-
ates its goals.57 Thus, it may be possible to answer specific questions like 
“does ERISA preempt all malpractice claims against participating medical 
providers?” by looking to the general structure or purpose of the statute.58 
But what if a statute, constitution, or body of law leaves gaps that cannot 
be filled by a narrow, one-off decision? In these situations, a court may be 
presented with a legal blank slate. 
B. Definition and Explanation 
A legal blank slate refers to a situation where formal sources of law offer 
little to no guidance for courts in addressing a broad legal issue. The para-
digm legal blank slate thus requires 1) a legal question that calls for the 
promulgation of a test or standard, and 2) the absence of useful formal guid-
ance for courts in shaping such a test or standard. 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2015). 
 53 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2005); Solum, supra note 1, at 520–23. 
 54 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
894–98 (1996). 
 55 POSNER, supra note 1, at 106–08; STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 38. 
 56 Merrill, supra note 19, at 43. See generally J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal 
Statutory Interpretation: Identifying the Sources of Interpretive Problems, 76 MISS. L.J. 55 (2006) 
(explaining the impossibility of formulating complete statutory rules for complex subject matter). 
 57 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 187–88 (1996). 
 58 See id. ERISA does not preempt all malpractice claims, although the relevant statutory 
language in context is indeterminate on the matter. See, e.g., Moreno v. Health Partners Health 
Plan, 4 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice 
was not preempted by ERISA); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 114 (D. Md. 1996) (holding 
that ERISA did not preempt a claim against an insurance group for physician negligence under the 
doctrine of vicarious liability); Haas v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 545 (S.D. Ill. 
1994) (holding that a vicarious liability claim was not preempted by ERISA); see also Christy, 
supra note 56, at 120–21 (noting that courts have not interpreted ERISA’s preemption clause 
literally, as doing so would eliminate all malpractice claims against medical providers). 
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The first part of this definition refers to those legal issues that compel 
courts to promulgate a standard or test that will govern future cases. Estab-
lishing such standards may be necessary so that future courts can address re-
lated questions consistently and equitably, and private parties and their law-
yers can determine the general legal rules that will apply to their conduct.59 In 
these situations, courts are not simply asked to decide whether a rule applies 
to a certain situation or whether a particular item or action fits into a statutory 
category. Instead, they are called upon to develop a test that potentially covers 
a broad range of conduct. Often, the litigating parties will expressly ask the 
court to formulate such a test and offer competing proposals for particular 
tests they believe the court should adopt.60 In other situations, to decide a 
case, courts may need to define a concept or provide a rationale for an out-
come where the definition or rationale are highly likely to guide future cases 
involving similar issues. For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the 
Court had to define the concept of a “hostile and abusive work environment,” 
and in doing so, formulated a test for future courts to apply.61 
The second part of the blank slates definition refers to situations where 
the traditional formal sources of law—text, context, legislative history, intent, 
historical practice, precedent—fail to provide useful guidance to courts on 
how to address a legal issue. This may occur because these formal sources are 
indeterminate, or because any formal guidance they might give has been re-
jected by widely accepted precedent or rendered obsolete by developments in 
related legal areas.62 For example, when courts were deciding whether a re-
striction on the time, place, or manner of speaking violated the First Amend-
ment, they had little to no formal guidance to assist them.63 The text of the 
First Amendment does not address such situations, the drafting history is si-
lent, and historical context sheds virtually no light on the subject.64 By con-
trast, even though the issue was controversial for decades, the text and pur-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1988). In the 
recent criminal case Maslenjak v. United States, the Court noted that it was important for the 
Court to formulate a test because “[t]he Government needs to know what prosecutions to bring; 
defendants need to know what defenses to offer; and district courts need to know how to instruct 
juries.” 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1927 n.4 (2017). 
 60 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (No. 75-871), 
1976 WL 181403, at *9–11 (in assessing a suggestive photo line-up, the court should use a totality 
of the circumstances test); Brief for Respondent, Manson, 432 U.S. 98 (No. 75-871), 1976 WL 
181405, at *12–29 (in assessing a suggestive photo line-up, the court should use a per se rule). 
 61 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993); infra notes 310–320 and ac-
companying text.  
 62 See infra notes 68–82 and accompanying text. 
 63 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
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pose of the First Amendment offers some guidance to courts trying to deter-
mine whether viewpoint-based speech legislation should be generally prohib-
ited.65 
It should be noted that “blank slates” need not be perfectly blank. A 
law’s history, text, or purpose may at least provide general inspiration for a 
way forward, even if the guidance and constraint they offer is negligible.66 
When formal sources of law provide minimal formal constraint or guidance, 
that is sufficient to identify a situation as a legal blank slate. 
Indeed, the “blankness” of a legal situation is a spectrum rather than a 
binary—the above description of the various kinds of legal indeterminacy 
demonstrates as much. Legal issues traverse a range, from those that can be 
clearly determined by existing formal law, to those where the law is contro-
versial or ambiguous, to those where courts must fill small gaps in existing 
law, all the way to blank slates, where courts must fill larger gaps with min-
imal formal guidance. This Article focuses on the extreme end of this spec-
trum, where formal law largely fades from view and blankness prevails. 
Nevertheless, examining cases involving legal blank slates can yield in-
sights that apply to the entire spectrum, as discussed in Part III.67 
C. How Blank Slates Arise 
To fully understand legal blank slates, it helps to understand how they 
originate. Legal blank slates can arise in a variety of ways. For example, 
when a court fills a narrow statutory gap by deciding that a type of conduct 
violates a statute, it may open up a broader gap that it later needs to fill. Case 
one may simply decide that an owner’s manipulative sales techniques violate 
a statute that prohibits “deceptive business practices” in retail stores. But soon 
enough, case two presents the question of what exactly “manipulative sales 
techniques” are, and the court will be compelled to give guidance to future 
courts and store owners regarding what is prohibited in the context of retail 
sales.68 This definitional question will likely present a blank slate, as the court 
must flesh out a concept not directly addressed in the text or history of the 
statute. Similar blank slates may arise in the common law context if a court 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394–95 (1950). As noted by Justice 
Black in his dissent, the Court conceded that an anti-communism provision in the Taft-Hartley Act 
would be unconstitutional under a textual interpretation of the First Amendment. Id. at 446 (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
 66 See Merrill, supra note 19, at 43 (recommending that courts facing difficult questions of 
interpretation use the general purpose of legislative enactments to construct a workable meaning). 
 67 See infra notes 338–392 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 310–320 and accompanying text (describing an analogous situation involv-
ing the Civil Rights Act). 
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fills a precedential gap with a broad concept and then future courts are asked 
to define that concept. 
Blank slates might also arise in the common law context if a case pre-
sents a broad question so new that no existing precedent provides a definitive 
analogy. Courts that find themselves in such a situation may feel compelled to 
promulgate a new rule or standard to address the novel, important question. 
This could occur, for instance, if courts hear cases involving advanced tech-
nologies that present unique legal issues.69 Even so, such cases are likely to 
be rare, especially given that the common law tends to evolve gradually and 
incrementally.70 
Blank slates may also occur when Congress writes a statute in terms so 
open-ended and abstract that they essentially amount to a directive to courts 
to develop a new body of common law to govern the issue. Many courts and 
commentators consider the Sherman Act to be such a statute,71 along with 
statutes such as Section 198372 and the Taft-Hartley Act.73 Such statutes can 
pose broad, novel questions for which there is neither statutory guidance nor 
a useful common-law analogue. 
Perhaps the most significant blank slates are those that arise over time as 
economic, cultural, or technological changes pose questions not contemplated 
by the framers of a law or covered by any formal sources. For instance, the 
process of societal change is likely the primary source of the blank slate sur-
rounding the scope of the Fourth Amendment.74 The Founders had little rea-
son to specify the scope of the “search” concept because most Founding-era 
searches involved a physical violation of the home or other property and were 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See generally Frederick D. Page & Norma M. Krayem, Are You Ready for Self-Driving 
Vehicles?, 29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14 (2017) (outlining the multitude of legal and ethical 
issues raised by self-driving cars). Likewise, new technologies can pose unique questions of pa-
tentability or copyrightability not addressed by existing intellectual property statutes or prece-
dents. See Jorge L. Contreras, Narratives of Gene Patenting, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1192–
94 (2016) (describing the primary arguments and concepts typically used in cases involving novel 
technological categories). 
 70 See Stone, supra note 47, at 6–7. 
 71 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
899–900 (2007) (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law 
statute.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (noting 
that the Sherman Act is just one example of how courts have been given the authority to create 
new common law). 
 72 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
421–22 (1989). 
 73 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1052 (1989). 
 74 See infra notes 221–308 and accompanying text. 
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thus easy to identify.75 Modern search questions arose in the radically differ-
ent context of the Twentieth Century, when police officers could use listening 
devices to record private activities or access intimate conversations transmit-
ted through wires over long distances.76 Neither the telephone, nor the “bug,” 
nor even the professional police officer existed in 1791.77 Blank slates arising 
from societal and technological changes may appear with increasing frequen-
cy in constitutional law, as we move ever further away from the world in 
which the Constitution was drafted. 
Substantial contextual change can also lead to the widespread rejection of 
those formal sources of law that might otherwise provide guidance. When cer-
tain interpretations of the text or history of a law would undermine the core 
values of the law if applied in a radically changed context, those interpreta-
tions are likely to be discarded. This may leave courts without guidance on 
future issues. For instance, a strict textual interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects” clause, which would allow the 
government to wiretap and bug citizens without a constitutional check, has 
been almost universally rejected.78 Likewise, interpreting the First Amend-
ment to bar only prior restraints, as its framers likely contemplated, has been 
near-universally rejected for almost a century.79 This widely accepted depar-
ture from historical practice raised new legal questions not addressed by exist-
ing formal sources, potentially creating several substantial blank slates.80 
Thus legal blank slates can arise for a variety of reasons, and in every 
area of law, from constitutional law to common law tort cases. To this point, 
however, scholars have not identified or considered blank slates separately 
from the far more common phenomena of legal indeterminacy and legal 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 
67, 70–76. 
 76 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing changes in com-
munication technology and surveillance since the Founding). 
 77 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
620 (1999). In the Founding-era, there was essentially no proactive law enforcement, and consta-
bles were generally poor civilians who did a year-long tour of duty with the goal of keeping the 
peace, not investigating crime. Id. at 620–22. The Framers did not directly address warrantless 
searches in part because constables were unlikely to search without warrants, lest they be sued or 
physically resisted. Id. at 625–26; Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82–83 (1988). As concerns about crime 
grew during the nineteenth century, professionalized police departments formed. Davies, supra, at 
725. Officers were given more ex officio authority and greater legal protection against citizen 
resistance. Id. These developments undermined the effectiveness of trespass actions against indi-
vidual officers as a means of enforcing Fourth Amendment values. Id. 
 78 See infra notes 241–253 and accompanying text. 
 79 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2198–99 
(2015). 
 80 See infra notes 95–125 and accompanying text. 
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gaps.81 The next Part analyzes how courts can optimally address legal blank 
slates.82 
II. A THEORY OF BLANK SLATES 
 Part I identified the phenomenon of legal blank slates and examined 
their origins.83 It may be useful for courts facing blank slates to know precise-
ly the situation they are in and to examine how courts have addressed similar 
situations in the past.84 But a coherent theory of blank slates and how courts 
can optimally address them is also necessary. 
Existing writing on legal indeterminacy does not address blank slates, 
and thus offers little insight as to how courts should develop a legal standard 
or test in the absence of formal guidance. Rather, scholars and judges who 
have acknowledged legal gaps have generally thought of judges filling gaps 
as acting in a legislative capacity.85 As such, judges can make policy largely 
according to what they think is best,86 consulting their moral intuitions,87 per-
sonal experience,88 policy judgments,89 or emotions.90 
This may be an accurate enough account of how judges will fill gaps in 
one-off cases. It may even describe how they will formulate tests and stand-
                                                                                                                           
 81 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 148 (recommending that judges consult moral intui-
tions to deal with legal gaps); RAZ, supra note 1, at 197–99 (discussing how judges should ap-
proach legal gaps). 
 82 See infra notes 83–161 and accompanying text. 
 83 See supra notes 25–82 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 162–337 and accompanying text. 
 85 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 197–99. Ronald Dworkin takes a philosophically different ap-
proach to doctrinal indeterminacy that ultimately offers judges similar advice. See RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 124, 128 (1977) (describing the central role of political 
and personal convictions in Dworkinian adjudication). Dworkin argues that judges should address 
difficult legal questions by choosing the outcome that fits best with the overarching narrative or 
theory of law and with political morality. DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 138–43; DWORKIN, supra, 
at 107. Although Dworkinian judges can look to the broad narrative of law and strive for norma-
tive consistency, this general approach to law does not specifically address blank slates or how 
courts should formulate legal tests in the absence of doctrinal guidance. Indeed, the choice struc-
ture described below may help Dworkinian judges determine which test or standard fits best with 
existing legal and normative structures. 
 86 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 1, at 197. This prescription for legal indeterminacy is shared not 
only by legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart and pragmatists like Richard Posner, but also by more 
formalist theorists. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the 
Supreme Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 777–78 (1963); Merrill, supra note 19, 
at 43. 
 87 EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 148. 
 88 Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Be-
tween Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 260–61 (1968). 
 89 STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 38. 
 90 POSNER, supra note 1, at 106. 
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ards when confronted with legal blank slates. Yet it offers little guidance as to 
how judges should approach such situations, or how to formulate tests that 
will effectively guide future cases and yield optimal outcomes. We currently 
lack a prescriptive theory of blank slates, one that could assist courts as they 
create legal tests with minimal formal guidance. 
The legal questions that present blank slates are indeed likely to be diffi-
cult to answer. They arise in the context of a legal dispute in unfamiliar terri-
tory, as courts weigh competing considerations and assess various potential 
tests to fill a doctrinal gap. In such situations, definitive moral or deontologi-
cal imperatives are unlikely to be found. Even in the constitutional context, 
blank slates rarely involve the core substance of constitutional rights. Rather, 
blank slates often occur where courts must specify the boundaries of a right 
or resolve ancillary issues that relate to rights. Moreover, in common law and 
statutory contexts, absolute rights tend not to be involved at all. 
What remains in most cases is a situation typical of decision-making in 
general: a balancing of competing considerations. Although many of our de-
cisions are automatic or habitual,91 people regularly make conscious deci-
sions—should I go to the gym? should I have a beer? should I go to this store 
or that one?—by informally weighing various considerations and choosing 
what they think will produce the best outcomes.92 
A court facing a legal blank slate is in a similar situation. It is presented 
with a legal question that reflects an underlying normative balance: in the 
absence of legislative commands or other formal guidance, and given the 
considerations favoring one outcome and those favoring an opposing out-
come, which should prevail? This innate balance is present even if courts 
avoid confronting it.93 Indeed, avoiding it may often be the best option, as the 
next section discusses.94 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 920–22 
(2015). 
 92 See Fried, supra note 86, at 764–65 (describing the informal balancing that we apply to our 
everyday decision making). 
 93 See, e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960) (“Of 
course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for a particular right, such as the fair trial 
requirements of the Fifth And Sixth Amendments and the right of free speech protection of the 
First, involves a balancing of competing interests.”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balanc-
ing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 845–46 (1994) (arguing that “balancing is ubiqui-
tous within what we describe as rules—indeed, it is hard to avoid”); Henkin, supra note 33, at 
1023–24 (describing the normative balance that underlies even clear constitutional rules); Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (“[J]udges them-
selves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social ad-
vantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal 
with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticu-
late, and often unconscious . . . .”). 
 94 See infra notes 95–125 and accompanying text. 
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A. Three Approaches to Blank Slates 
Courts confronting legal blank slates might pursue one of three general 
strategies. First, they can engage in direct normative balancing, instructing 
future courts to expressly weigh the competing considerations at issue.95 Sec-
ond, they can use a proxy value, which is meant to capture the normative val-
ues at stake, but is easier for judges to apply.96 Finally, they can “choose not 
to choose” by refusing to promulgate any test to fill the blank slate and simp-
ly resolving the case without providing a substantive explanation or ra-
tionale.97 This section describes each of these general strategies in turn.98 
1. Direct Normative Balancing 
 Addressing a blank slate with direct normative balancing entails estab-
lishing a balancing test that encompasses important considerations on each 
side of an issue and weighs them against each other. Subsequent cases could 
then employ the same balancing test to resolve similar questions. Over time, 
however, rules might be promulgated to address particular situations, as 
courts identify areas where normative balancing consistently yields one out-
come instead of another. This process of “rulification” is similar to that ob-
served in common law contexts evolving over time.99 
The creation of a normative balancing test generally requires courts to 
identify the core normative or policy considerations surrounding a legal ques-
tion.100 Concrete factors that can be evaluated with real-world data are prefer-
able to vague or abstract values, all other things being equal.101 In order to 
create a workable test, courts generally exclude considerations that are less 
important or are particularly difficult to understand or quantify.102 Nonethe-
less, one of the primary benefits of direct normative balancing is that it allows 
judges to take account of the complexities of an issue and the many factors 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra notes 108–114 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 116–125 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 99–125 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 654–55 (2014). 
 100 See Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 16, 22–25 (1988) (discussing how balancing calls for judges to be open about the considera-
tions that drive their decisions and laying out various principles of good balancing). 
 101 See Gottlieb, supra note 93, at 858. 
 102 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 977–78 (1987) (highlighting the problem of potential underinclusiveness in balancing tests); 
Coffin, supra note 100, at 25 (discussing the dangers of making balancing tests too fact-specific to 
offer guidance to future cases). Courts typically cannot evaluate and discuss every factor that 
might potentially bear on a decision, and even “totality of the circumstances” tests are unlikely to 
consider every relevant circumstance. Id. at 977–78.  
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that might determine its optimal outcome. Another benefit is that it encour-
ages transparency, directing judges to give a full account of their decision-
making process and subjecting that account to public and professional ap-
praisal.103 This judicial openness can reveal judges’ faulty assumptions, illog-
ic, or biases, and offer convincing guidance for future courts to follow.104 The 
balancing test used in First Amendment law to evaluate restrictions on the 
speech of government employees is an example of a direct normative bal-
ancing test that addresses a legal blank slate.105 It explicitly weighs the in-
terests of employees in commenting on public matters against the interests 
of the government, as an employer, in efficiently providing public ser-
vices.106 Similarly, courts engage in direct normative balancing when de-
termining the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause.107 
2. Proxy Values  
A proxy value, or a “false target,” is a standard or rule that is meant to 
stand in for the normative balance underlying a legal question. The proxy 
value is intended to embody the key normative considerations and capture 
what is essential about the normative question being decided. Rather than 
directly addressing the normative values at issue, courts can focus on a proxy 
standard and decide the case according to whether the standard is met. This 
will generally make the inquiry conceptually simpler, and it may reduce 
courts’ decision costs, depending on how easy the standard is to adjudicate.108 
Indeed, administrability and conceptual clarity are the primary benefits of 
proxy values relative to direct normative balancing. 
The Katz test is an example of a proxy test; it directs courts to look at 
people’s expectations of privacy as a proxy for the normative question of 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Coffin, supra note 100, at 24–25. 
 104 Id. Public and peer scrutiny of such decisions can also result in improved decisions over 
time, encouraging consensus and deterring decisions based on flawed or biased reasoning. Id.; see 
also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 
CAL. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for 
his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them . . . . 
Moreover, this approach should make it more difficult for judges to rest on their predispositions 
without ever subjecting them to the test of reason. It should also make their accounts more ration-
ally auditable.”). 
 105 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
 106 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (weighing a teacher’s interest in mak-
ing public comments as a citizen against the State’s interest in efficiently providing public ser-
vices). 
 107 See infra notes 199–220 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. On average, proxy tests will have lower deci-
sion costs than normative balancing tests. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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whether they should have privacy.109 Thus, at least in most cases, courts do 
not directly balance privacy interests against law enforcement interests in or-
der to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment.110 If an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, that is normally sufficient to establish that 
the Fourth Amendment applies without further inquiry.111 Put simply, the 
proxy dictates the scope of the Amendment. Likewise, in medical malpractice 
cases, courts typically use the industry standard of care as a proxy and do not 
directly balance the burdens and harms of particular medical precautions.112 
Proxy tests can be inspired by history, the general purpose of a law, a 
sense of “best fit” with existing legal structures, or broader normative theo-
ries.113 For instance, Katz was likely inspired in part by the Fourth Amend-
ment’s general purpose of protecting citizens’ privacy from arbitrary govern-
mental intrusion.114 But this abstract idea did not compel the particular Katz 
test and did not offer guidance as to how courts should determine the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment in particular cases. History, fit, or broad normative 
theories may likewise inspire proxy tests, but in a blank slate situation, they 
do not compel them. 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 110 Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984) (noting that with respect to incarcera-
tion of prisoners, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches does not ap-
ply). 
 111 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that bus passengers have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy against tactile inspections of their luggage); Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–100 (1990) (concluding that society recognizes that overnight guests in 
homes have a legitimate expectation of privacy); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 
(1988) (ruling that respondents did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to items in 
plastic garbage bags that they left on the side of a public street). 
 112 E.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985) (noting that the applicable standard 
of care was that of the reasonable diligence and skill of minimally competent physicians in the 
same specialty or field of practice under the same circumstances). See generally Michelle M. 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 654–61 (2001) (describing the standard of care for medical 
malpractice cases). 
 113 See DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 134–42 (describing the concept of narrative fit as a means 
of reaching “right” answers in otherwise irresoluble and ambiguous legal disputes); William Bau-
de & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1821, 1837–50 (2016) (proposing positive law as a proxy for Fourth Amendment scope inspired in 
part by history, structural fit, and purpose); Solum, supra note 52, at 5 (discussing proposals that 
suggest resolving constitutional questions arising from indeterminate constitutional text using 
normative considerations). 
 114 See infra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
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3. Choosing Not to Choose 
A court facing a blank slate could choose to do nothing. That is, it can 
decline to promulgate a test, even though the situation seems to call for one in 
order to give guidance to affected parties and promote consistency and equali-
ty in future adjudication. A court could simply reach a decision that a given 
set of facts constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, or a “hostile and abusive 
work environment” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, without explaining 
why.115 
This approach would be most feasible for district courts, which can gen-
erally decline to issue opinions and whose opinions are not technically bind-
ing on future courts.116 This silent approach might be justified on the grounds 
that higher courts, or any court deciding later in time, may be better suited 
than the initial trial court to formulate the optimal test. Appellate courts may 
have institutional advantages—fewer cases, multi-judge panels, more experi-
enced judges—that make them better suited for establishing standards to gov-
ern future cases. Courts deciding later in time may also have an advantage 
because they can examine earlier case outcomes for useful patterns or other 
data. For instance, if nineteen cases have found a search when government 
agents track people with drones, and only one case has not found a search, 
then the court hearing the twenty-first case could confidently promulgate a 
rule that tracking people with drones constitutes a search. In this process, sim-
ilar to the classic common law process, courts could slowly create rules to 
govern a body of law. The downside of this approach in blank slate situations 
is that it leaves affected parties without guidance and risks creating chaos and 
inconsistency among courts. What would happen, for instance, if the first 
twenty cases are evenly split 10-10? Moreover, a similar process of rulifica-
tion is likely to occur if courts take a direct normative balancing approach, 
which would have the additional benefit of transparency and would offer at 
least some guidance for courts and affected parties.117 
Choosing not to choose is also difficult for appellate courts, which gen-
erally issue written opinions explaining their reasoning, especially in cases of 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Cf. infra notes 148–161 and accompanying text. 
 116 See, e.g., Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., 240 F.3d 956, 965 
(11th Cir. 2001) (noting that unlike circuit courts, district court decisions can only be persuasive 
and not binding on other courts); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 
1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that binding precedent for a district court is only set by the 
Supreme Court and by the court of appeals for the circuit containing the district court), aff’d sub 
nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, L.T.D., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). 
 117 See infra notes 368–382 and accompanying text. 
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first impression.118 If an appeals court writes an opinion, it is likely that its 
reasoning and mode of analysis will be followed by lower courts, even if it 
did not intend to expressly establish a test or standard.119 Courts may thus 
create some tests inadvertently. Interestingly, something similar happened to 
the majority in Katz, which did not set out any test for the Fourth Amend-
ment’s scope going forward.120 The famous Katz test comes instead from Jus-
tice Harlan’s solo concurrence.121 Harlan’s ultimately flawed approach be-
came dominant because courts faced with difficult decisions sought guidance 
from a legal test, and Harlan’s was the only one available.122 
Choosing not to choose thus likely works best as a temporary solution 
primarily available to district court judges. Judges who have no insight into a 
particular legal issue, or who doubt their institutional or personal capacity to 
address it, can resolve the case without an opinion and leave it to future courts 
to fill in the blank slate. This might minimize poorly reasoned precedents and 
allow courts to self-sort according to their interest in a particular legal ques-
tion and capacity for addressing it. Legislatures might also eventually address 
legal questions, bringing to bear their expertise in rule promulgation.123 But, 
at least in the statutory and common law contexts, legislatures are equally 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c) (stating that “[i]t is the policy of this court to publish opinions 
and explanatory memoranda that have general public interest,” and providing that an opinion “will 
be published” if the case meets one of several criteria, including “case[s] of first impression or the 
first case to present the issue in this court”); 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(1) (stating that “the court thinks it 
desirable that opinions be published” so that they can be cited to, a policy that can only be over-
come in those cases where the opinion does not address novel facts or law or otherwise provide 
relevant guidance to future litigants).  
 119 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 
(1989). 
 120 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362. 
 121 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting out a test based on a person’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy). 
 122 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 56, 113 (1997) (describing the necessity of legal tests). Indeed, several appeals 
courts relied on Justice Harlan’s concurrence for guidance soon after Katz. See, e.g., Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1969) (affirming defendant’s conviction for 
rape after applying the reasoning from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz); Ponce v. Craven, 
409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969) (applying Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Katz to find that de-
fendant’s reliance on privacy in his motel room was not reasonable under the circumstances). 
 123 Of course, the wait for legislatures to address unresolved legal issues may be a very long 
wait. Legislatures may be reluctant to involve themselves in establishing doctrinal tests or may 
focus on more politically salient issues. Further, the substantial enactment costs of legislation and 
the preferences of entrenched interest groups combine to produce a powerful bias in favor of legis-
lative inaction. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO 
WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009). This legislative status-quo bias is likely increas-
ing over time, as political parties grow more polarized and the use of filibusters becomes routine. 
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
14 (2014). 
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able to weigh in after courts have acted—indeed, legislatures may learn from 
existing legal tests, modifying or correcting them based on the lessons of ex-
perience.124 
What happens when a court does attempt to address a broad legal ques-
tion for which there is little formal guidance? The next section examines how 
courts should choose between direct normative balancing and proxy values 
when confronted with a legal blank slate.125 
B. Choosing an Approach 
Selecting a test to fill in a legal blank slate is both difficult and im-
portant. If adopted by other courts, the test will govern adjudication of a 
broad legal issue for the foreseeable future. It is worth considering the choice 
in some detail. 
As discussed above, the foundational strategic question is whether the 
test should be a direct normative balancing test or whether courts should use a 
proxy value that stands in for the underlying normative balance.126 There are 
several considerations that bear on this question. This section describes these 
factors in descending order of importance. 
1. How Likely Is It That a Proxy Value Can Capture the Underlying 
Normative Balance at Issue?  
The first factor looks to how well the proxy value captures important el-
ements of the underlying normative balance. The more that a proxy fails to 
encompass significant normative considerations, the less effective it will be in 
optimally resolving legal disputes. Such proxies may, for instance, resolve 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (upholding Mobile’s electoral 
system under the Voting Rights Act and interpreting the Act as only prohibiting purposeful dis-
crimination). In 1982, in response to the holding, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 to establish a discriminatory effects test and make clear that a statutory violation did not 
require discriminatory purpose. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, sec. 2, § 3, 96 Stat. 
131, 134 (1982); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36–40 (1982) (describing the practical flaws in the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation and the resulting bad consequences, which helped motivate Congress 
to amend and improve the test). In the constitutional context, legislatures may pass laws that em-
body an interpretation of the Constitution and help to fill in its gaps, but ultimately, interpreting 
the Constitution and addressing its indeterminacies is the province of the judiciary. See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 125 See infra notes 126–147 and accompanying text. 
 126 See supra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. 
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cases on grounds that are irrelevant to the values at stake, leading to absurd 
results.127 
There are three sub-factors that courts can examine when assessing how 
effective proxies are likely to be in a given situation. One is the complexity of 
the underlying concept. In general, the more complex the legal issue, the 
more difficult it will be to effectively capture it with a proxy value.128 For 
instance, blank slates associated with the First Amendment may present espe-
cially complex issues, because issues of speech implicate numerous compet-
ing values and difficult definitional questions.129 In such situations, it will be 
challenging to create a proxy test that captures all of the fundamental interests 
at stake. Accordingly, normative balancing tests are likely to be the more ef-
fective approach in these circumstances. Indeed, balancing tests are common 
in First Amendment law, especially in areas where courts had to promulgate 
tests with little textual or historical guidance.130 
Another consideration is how stable a legal question is likely to be over 
time. The more likely it is that the context or normative calculus of a legal 
question will change over time, the less likely that a proxy value will effec-
tively resolve the question in future cases. For instance, the use of property 
intrusion as a proxy standard for Fourth Amendment “search” failed in part 
because technology and law enforcement changed so radically over the years 
that property no longer served as an effective proxy for the normative calcu-
lus underlying the concept of a “search.”131 Although future change is hard to 
foresee, some areas of law are more stable than others. In areas like govern-
ment surveillance, where technological and social change has repeatedly de-
stabilized proxy standards, balancing approaches may be more effective, all 
other things being equal.132 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
139, 194 (2016) (describing how property-based Fourth Amendment approaches can lead to arbi-
trary and absurd results). 
 128 A concept might be complex if there are numerous, ambiguous, and/or conflicting values 
on either side of the issue. Simple concepts will generally not implicate many such values. A con-
cept might also be simple if most of the normative considerations point strongly in one direction. 
Thus, if the interests on one side of a normative balance are weighty and numerous, and those on 
the other side are trivial, that would reduce the complexity of the underlying issue and make it 
more likely that a proxy could capture it. 
 129 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 167–198 and accompanying text. 
 131 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 132 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s adoption and rejection of 
various Fourth Amendment tests, a process driven in part by technological change). This is also 
likely true of areas of law that often address transformative new technologies, like intellectual 
property. Areas like real property law or torts have certainly undergone transformative changes 
over time, but may be relatively stable and less sensitive to technological change. 
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A third consideration is the breadth of the legal issue. The broader the 
legal question the court is addressing, and the greater the variety of cases that 
will be governed by a test, the less likely it is that a proxy value will be able 
to effectively resolve the cases. In other words, proxies will tend to perform 
best when addressing relatively narrow questions. Thus, it may be difficult to 
forge a proxy to cover the entirety of Fourth Amendment search questions. 
Nevertheless, a proxy may be optimal for addressing narrower questions of 
what police conduct is reasonable in particular search contexts.133 
2. How Much Easier Is a Potential Proxy Test to Administer? 
The second factor considers the relative ease of administering a potential 
proxy test. The more a proxy value reduces decision costs and ambiguity in 
adjudication, the more likely it is to be a better choice than direct normative 
balancing. In some scenarios, a proxy test may be quicker and easier to apply 
than a direct balancing test.134 In addition, a proxy may be conceptually easier 
to grasp than a normative test. A simpler, clearer legal concept may improve 
adjudication even if it does not reduce concrete adjudication costs like judi-
cial time and effort.135 
Not every proxy will reduce decision costs. In fact, certain proxies may 
be more difficult to adjudicate than a balancing test.136 Likewise, the clarity 
and concreteness of legal proxies will vary substantially. Some will be far 
easier to grasp than a normative balancing approach,137 whereas some will be 
only slightly more tractable,138 and others may be even harder to grasp con-
ceptually than a balancing test.139 
3. How Likely Are Courts to Be Able to Obtain and Process the Information 
Necessary for Effective Normative Balancing?   
The third factor considers the likelihood that courts will be able to col-
lect and process the information necessary for normative balancing. The more 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text. 
 134 See, e.g., infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text. 
 135 Tokson, supra note 91, at 912–16 (discussing the difference between time and effort costs 
and the cognitive costs of processing new concepts). 
 136 See Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 320–26 (2016), 
http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/vol129_Re.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCP2-
SEGF] (noting that, in many cases, using civil law as a proxy for the Fourth Amendment’s scope 
would lead to confusion and indeterminacy). 
 137 See infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 310–320 and accompanying text. 
 139 The Katz proxy test as applied has become extremely conceptually complex, incorporating 
at least four overlapping models of decision-making, including policy balancing as well as several 
others. See Kerr, supra note 4, at 507–22. 
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information relevant to a normative balance that courts can assess, the more 
effective a direct balancing test will be. For instance, if courts are attempting 
to decide whether the statewide benefits of a regulation outweigh its burdens 
on interstate commerce, it will help to have government studies on the pro-
jected benefits and costs of the regulation, private or academic reports on its 
effects, general economics treatises, statistics on interstate trade flows in a 
particular industry, and other sources of relevant information.140 
Relevant information for effective normative balancing may come from 
several sources. The government’s briefs will generally contain relevant gov-
ernment statistics or reports. Briefs in general may contain “legislative facts,” 
which include social science, statistics, and economic data that can help 
courts address normative and policy issues.141 Parties may call expert wit-
nesses who collect or cite the relevant academic literature and prepare their 
own reports. Courts also have their own information-gathering capacities and 
may have access to useful “systemic facts” in frequently litigated areas like 
criminal justice and criminal procedure.142 
When important aspects of a normative balance have been studied and 
courts are likely to obtain the relevant information from one of the above 
sources, it is more likely that courts can effectively apply a normative balanc-
ing test. If the relevant information cannot be accessed or there is no concrete 
information on an issue, then courts may struggle to balance competing con-
siderations. For instance, information regarding national security programs or 
the international effects of U.S. policies may be difficult to obtain. 
A court must not only be able to obtain relevant information, but must 
also be able to understand and apply that information. Judges may not be 
competent to deal with advanced econometric or technological data, for ex-
ample. In some cases, additional information may actually reduce the quality 
of decisions by overloading judges and making it more difficult to identify 
important data.143 The type and quality of information available, and not just 
its abundance, will be important in assessing whether courts are likely to ef-
fectively conduct a normative balance. 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See infra notes 199–220 and accompanying text. 
 141 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO L.J. 1, 30–31 (2013). 
 142 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal 
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2068–70 (2016). 
 143 Gottlieb, supra note 93, at 858. See generally Mark I. Hwang & Jerry W. Lin, Information 
Dimension, Information Overload and Decision Quality, 25 J. INFO. SCI. 213 (1999) (noting that 
informational overload can have an adverse impact on the quality of decision making). 
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4. Integrating the Factors 
In some cases, the above considerations will clearly weigh in favor of ei-
ther direct balancing or a proxy value test. The paradigm balancing test situa-
tion is one that involves broad, complex issues on which there are helpful and 
available legislative or systemic facts. The paradigm situation for a proxy test 
occurs when an issue is relatively narrow and straightforward, relevant data is 
unavailable, and a proxy value exists that would be substantially easier to 
administer than a balancing test. 
Most situations will not be so clear-cut. A potential proxy test may be 
easier to apply; yet the underlying issue may be so broad and complex that a 
proxy is unlikely to effectively represent the underlying normative balance. In 
general, the ability of the proxy to capture the normative balance will be the 
most important consideration. A proxy that fails to encompass fundamental 
values is likely to generate error costs that dwarf any benefits from easier de-
cision-making.144 Regardless, in some contexts, a proxy value that is only 
moderately successful at capturing a normative balance may be optimal if it is 
far more administrable, or if information vital to normative balancing is una-
vailable. 
In general, the availability of information is less likely than the other 
factors to be a definitive consideration, in part because some useful legislative 
and systemic information is likely to be available for almost any substantial 
legal or policy question. Legal scholarship and other academic research often 
address novel issues and may be especially helpful to courts in cases where 
other sources of relevant information are scarce.145 Nonetheless, information 
availability is a substantial factor in choosing between balancing and proxy 
regimes, especially when the decision presents a close call otherwise. 
This section has offered three key factors for courts to consider when 
choosing between a direct normative balancing test and a proxy value test.146 
This meta-test does not of course encompass every consideration that might 
possibly bear on the decision.147 In most cases, however, examining how well 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Re, supra note 136, at 318 (discussing the arbitrariness of a positive law test for the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope); Tokson, supra note 127, at 194 (describing how arbitrary standards 
for Fourth Amendment scope can lead to absurd results). 
 145 See Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme 
Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016 (2012) (noting that the Supreme 
Court “disproportionately uses legal scholarship when cases are either more important or more 
difficult to decide”). 
 146 See supra notes 126–145 and accompanying text. 
 147 For instance, it may be useful for courts to consider the importance of the average decision 
in a particular legal area. If reaching an accurate conclusion is especially important in terms of the 
number of people affected, economic value, national security, etc., then courts have reason to 
incur substantial decision costs in order to minimize erroneous decisions. See Gottlieb, supra note 
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a proxy can capture the underlying balance, how much easier the proxy is to 
administer, and whether courts can obtain information relevant to balancing, 
will point courts towards the optimal choice. 
C. Distinguishing and Incorporating Rules Versus Standards 
The choice between normative balancing and proxy values is similar in 
some ways to the choice between rules and standards. Like any choice be-
tween two legal regimes, it involves comparing decision costs and error costs, 
and the factors described above are intended to help courts make this compar-
ison.148 But the two queries differ in many ways, and this section discusses 
their differences. It then incorporates some of the insights of the rules and 
standards literature into the choice between normative balancing and proxy 
approaches. 
Balancing tests are a type of standard, one that weighs several factors 
against each other in order to yield a conclusion.149 But proxy tests can be 
standards too. For instance, the Katz test’s “reasonable expectation of priva-
cy” is a standard rather than a bright-line rule.150 Likewise, the industry 
standards of care that determine reasonableness in some areas of tort law tend 
to be standards rather than bright-line rules.151 
Indeed, bright-line rules are unlikely to be workable in many blank slate 
situations. Proxy rules will be most appropriate for relatively simple blank 
                                                                                                                           
93, at 856 (discussing optimal decision-making strategies). Accordingly, a legal test that is costly 
to apply but more likely to produce correct outcomes would be optimal in situations where the 
average legal case is likely to be important. Direct normative balancing tests may be more likely 
to produce correct decisions (along with high decision costs), and so may be optimal in high-
importance contexts. This is complicated, however, by the fact that normative balancing tests will 
sometimes produce more errors than proxy tests, such as when there is little available information 
relevant to the normative balance and there is an effective and concrete proxy value available. 
Further, some proxy values will carry higher decision costs than balancing tests, such as when a 
proxy standard is difficult to administer or has many complicated sub-layers. See supra note 136 
and accompanying text. The importance of a particular legal issue may also be controversial and 
difficult to assess ex ante. 
 148 See Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and Sexual Har-
assment, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1999) (discussing the costs of decision-making 
itself and the costs imposed by erroneous decisions). 
 149 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
60–61 (1992) (referring to the process of balancing as a “standard-like regime”). There are many 
other kinds of standards as well. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 27–33 (discussing different 
types of standards and standard-like decision-making regimes). A classic standard would be a law 
that prohibits cars from driving at an “excessive” speed. Id. at 27. 
 150 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 151 See, e.g., Tom Vesper et al., Retail Stores, Risk, and Res Ipsa, TRIAL, Aug. 2013, at 32, 34 
(noting that knowing the industry’s risk prevention and safety standards is crucial to proving a 
negligence claim). 
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slates where normative considerations weigh heavily in favor of one out-
come.152 In less straightforward situations, courts using proxies are likely to 
favor proxy standards. 
If a potential proxy test is a bright-line rule, then it will have the ad-
vantages of such rules, including predictability for private actors and con-
sistency in adjudication.153 It will also have the drawbacks, like over- or un-
der-inclusiveness and the potential for evasion and loopholes.154 These fea-
tures will be relevant to the choice between the proxy test and a direct balanc-
ing regime. But courts should still evaluate how well the potential proxy cap-
tures the normative values at issue, what information is available to courts, 
and how much more administrable the proxy is than a direct balancing test. 
Those questions need to be addressed whether the proxy test is a rule or a 
standard.155 
Finally, legal tests can have multiple layers that encompass both rules 
and standards. A general, overarching test may incorporate several sub-tests 
that only apply in certain circumstances. For instance, a high-level normative 
balancing approach can, over time, yield numerous bright-line rules as courts 
“rulify” the law by creating sub-rules to address particular situations.156 
Though negligence is a broad legal standard, it encompasses rules that ad-
dress specific negligence issues, including the one-bite rule and the last-clear-
chance rule.157 Thus a normative balancing approach might ultimately pro-
duce a largely rules-based regime, with only very novel cases addressed by a 
balancing test.158 
Likewise, a high-level proxy rule can incorporate numerous complex 
standards as it is applied. For example, some scholars have proposed a posi-
tive law test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope, with a simple high-level rule: 
a police action is a search if it is tortious or it violates some existing law.159 
But this rule embodies a multitude of complicated and amorphous standards, 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text; see also supra note 128 and accompany-
ing text.  
 153 Sullivan, supra note 149, at 62–63. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Although considering the advantages and drawbacks of rules and standards as well as 
those of balancing tests and proxies may be time-consuming and costly, it is likely worthwhile. 
Cases that create new legal tests are frequently very important. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 595 (1992). 
 156 See Coenen, supra note 99, at 654–55. 
 157 E.g., Fouts v. Builders Transp., Inc., 474 S.E.2d 746, 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (applying 
the last-clear-chance rule); Coogan v. Nelson, 92 A.3d 213, 218 (R.I. 2014) (discussing the appli-
cation of the one-bite rule). 
 158 See infra notes 383–392 and accompanying text. 
 159 See Baude & Stern, supra note 113, at 1825. 
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because many torts and laws use such standards.160 The positive law test is 
thus far more difficult to apply than it might initially appear.161 When consid-
ering the administrability of a proxy test, courts must take into account each 
layer of its application, not just the highest level. 
III. BLANK SLATES IN THE COURTS 
Blank slates represent extreme cases of legal indeterminacy. Yet blank 
slates are not especially rare and can be found in a variety of areas of law. 
Often, they involve significant public policy issues or shape some of our most 
fundamental constitutional rights.162 
This section gives an overview of legal blank slates and examines how 
courts have addressed them.163 These summaries are necessarily brief and 
may not cover every potential formal argument or creative historical claim.164 
Nonetheless, the situations described below were those in which courts had 
minimal formal guidance or constraint and were nevertheless asked to devel-
op a legal test to guide future decisions.165 These examples can illuminate the 
different approaches courts can take to blank slates and offer lessons for 
courts facing similar situations in the future.166 
A. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech has raised numerous is-
sues on which text, history, and purpose presented little guidance. Courts 
have gradually filled in many of these blank slates over the course of the past 
century. Typically, courts have done so with balancing tests, which are perva-
sive in First Amendment law.167 
The text of the First Amendment’s free speech clause prohibits “abridg-
ing the freedom of speech,” a rather short phrase that is both abstract and am-
                                                                                                                           
 160 Re, supra note 136, at 320–21. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See infra notes 163–337 and accompanying text. Blank slates often arise as courts address 
the Bill of Rights, which frequently features vague, general text and very little direct legislative or 
other history. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1032–34 (2011). 
 163 See infra notes 167–337 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 167–337 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 167–337 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 167–337 and accompanying text. 
 167 Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2009) (“[B]alancing tests generally prevail in First Amendment 
analysis.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779 (2001) 
(describing the pervasiveness of balancing in modern First Amendment opinions). 
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biguous.168 As one scholar has noted, “it is not obvious what constitutes an 
abridgement, and it is not obvious what constitutes the freedom of speech.”169 
About all that is clear is that the First Amendment does not prohibit all 
abridgements of speech, because laws regulating things like copyrights, espi-
onage, and perjury are largely unaffected by the First Amendment.170 
The text does appear to limit the Amendment’s scope to laws made by 
“Congress,”171 but courts have implicitly rejected any such limitation in ap-
plying the Amendment to state laws and judicial prior restraints.172 A contrary 
interpretation of the Amendment would allow the states or the judiciary to 
restrict speech without constitutional regulation, a potentially disastrous out-
come in normative terms and one that might undermine any meaningful 
“freedom of speech.” Thus, “Congress,” as used in the First Amendment, has 
not been interpreted as a hard limit on the scope of the constitutional right. 
The general ambiguity of the First Amendment’s text is compounded by 
its history. The legislative history of the Amendment sheds almost no light on 
its scope or meaning, especially with respect to free speech.173 There are no 
records of the Senate deliberations or the relevant ratification debates in the 
state legislatures.174 The House debates are not illuminating either.175 Moreo-
ver, the concept of freedom of speech, at least as a cognizable legal right, 
“had almost no history as a concept or a practice prior to the [ratification of 
the] First Amendment or even later.”176 
                                                                                                                           
 168 STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 57 (noting that the text of the First Amendment “simply does 
not tell us much”); Mendelson, supra note 104, at 821 (noting that “the language of the first 
amendment is highly ambiguous”). 
 169 STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 57; see also G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, 
Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 891–
92 (“[T]he Amendment neither defines ‘speech’ nor explains what kinds of laws constitute 
‘abridging’ freedom of speech. The history of the Amendment is also uninformative.”). 
 170 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied 
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 937 (1968); see also Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971) (explaining 
why a reading of the First Amendment that prohibits any and all restraints on communication “is, 
of course, impossible”). 
 171 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 172 See generally Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1156 (1986) (analyzing the outlines of the First Amendment’s scope in detail). Following the 
incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, 
courts have also consistently applied the free speech guarantee to the states. See id. at 1210–11. 
 173 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE SUPREME COURT, at xvii (Terry Eastland ed. 2000). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 5 (1960) (“[Freedom of speech] developed 
as an offshoot of freedom of the press, on the one hand, and on the other, freedom of religion—the 
freedom to speak openly on religious matters. But as an independent concept referring to a citi-
zen’s personal right to speak his mind, freedom of speech was a very late development, virtually a 
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In the early years following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the na-
ture of the free speech right was contested and unclear. Generally, the 
Amendment was understood to provide total protection against prior re-
straints on speech but only limited protection against after-the-fact punish-
ment.177 The constitutionality of criminalizing seditious speech was an open 
question, and political leaders tended to change positions on sedition laws 
depending on whether they held power.178 Ultimately, “[t]he Framers seem to 
have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been over-
ly concerned with the subject.”179 
In the 1960s, following a vigorous debate, the Supreme Court interpret-
ed the First Amendment to provide nearly absolute protection against view-
point-based restrictions on speech by private citizens.180 This is a plausible 
(though not definitive) interpretation of the First Amendment’s protection of 
freedom of speech.181 But what about laws that only incidentally affect 
speech, or laws that regulate the speech of government employees or com-
mercial entities? Neither text nor any other formal source provides useful 
guidance on these ancillary questions.182   
                                                                                                                           
new concept without basis in everyday experience and nearly unknown to legal and constitutional 
history or to libertarian thought on either side of the Atlantic prior to the First Amendment.”); cf. 
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 175 (2017) (contend-
ing that free speech was known to late 18th-century legal elites as a largely non-enforceable natu-
ral rights concept). 
 177 Lakier, supra note 79, at 2179. 
 178 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 170, at 22 (noting that libertarian views about the First 
Amendment were not widely held even among Jeffersonians and that Jefferson himself approved 
of state prosecutions for seditious libel); Mendelson, supra note 104, at 822 (quoting both Jeffer-
son’s endorsement of free expression principles and his later, vigorous endorsement of prosecu-
tions of opposition journalists). 
 179 Bork, supra note 170, at 22; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech: And Its Relation 
to Self-Government by Alexander Meiklejohn, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949) (book review) 
(“The truth is, I think, that the framers had no very clear idea as to what they meant by ‘the free-
dom of speech or of the press.’”). 
 180 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (holding an Ohio law uncon-
stitutional because the plaintiff’s speech was not an incitement and was therefore protected 
speech). 
 181 For an argument that the text does not provide such near-absolute protection against view-
point discrimination, see Mendelson, supra note 104, at 821–25. 
 182 In a recent article, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick suggest that current laws governing 
time, place, and manner restrictions are consistent with the “spirit” of the First Amendment, and 
that the general spirit of constitutional provisions can help courts fashion laws consistent with 
originalist values when formal sources of law are ambiguous. See Randy Barnett & Evan Bernick, 
The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism 37–40, 44–47 (Oct. 5, 2017) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056. Originalist 
and non-originalist judges alike might indeed contemplate the general spirit of a law when con-
struing it. Nonetheless, judges addressing the question of incidental time, place, and manner re-
strictions are doing so in the absence of guidance by formal sources of law, in an area where virtu-
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Over the course of the last century, the Supreme Court has gradually 
filled in these blank slates, typically using balancing tests. The Court’s first 
tentative step towards balancing came in 1939 in Schneider v. New Jersey, 
where the Court struck down ordinances banning the distribution of pam-
phlets in certain public places.183 The Court reasoned that keeping the streets 
clean and presentable was an insufficient justification for an ordinance that 
prevented a person from handing pamphlets on a public street to willing re-
cipients, and noted that narrower methods, like simply punishing littering, 
could accomplish the same goal.184 In 1940s cases, the Court expressly stated 
that “courts must balance”185 and “weigh”186 community interests against free 
speech values in cases involving time, place, or manner restrictions on 
speech. 
In the 1980s, this balancing approach was formalized into an intermedi-
ate scrutiny test. Under this test, a time, place, or manner restriction is valid if 
it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” and 
“leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation.”187 The intermediate scrutiny test is essentially a balancing test,188 
one that requires courts to “strike an appropriate balance between achieving 
[government] goals and protecting constitutional rights.”189 If the benefits of 
a non-content restriction are minor, they will not justify incidental burdens on 
speech.190 If the benefits are substantial, they likely will justify such bur-
dens.191 
Intermediate scrutiny and related balancing tests now cover a wide vari-
ety of First Amendment issues. Regulations of commercial speech, symbolic 
conduct (like burning a draft card), cable television, adult businesses, and 
charitable solicitation are assessed under various forms and variants of the 
                                                                                                                           
ally any standard could be said to comport with the necessarily ambiguous spirit of the First 
Amendment. 
 183 308 U.S. 147, 162–65 (1939). 
 184 Id. at 162. 
 185 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (striking down an ordinance requiring a per-
mit for the use of a sound-amplification device). 
 186 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (overturning an ordinance prohibit-
ing handing out leaflets door-to-door). 
 187 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288 (1984)). 
 188 E.g., Blocher, supra note 167, at 392. 
 189 Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Casey v. City of Newport, 308 
F.3d 106, 116 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Inescapably, the application of the narrow tailoring test entails a 
delicate balancing judgment by the court.”); Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (“Despite the seemingly mathematical character of the metaphor, the Supreme Court in fact 
applies [the narrow-tailoring requirement] as a balancing test.”). 
 190 Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1184–85. 
 191 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–802. 
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intermediate scrutiny test.192 Speech by government employees is governed 
by an unstructured balancing test that aims “to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the ef-
ficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”193 
Blank slate theory can help explain why balancing tests appear so fre-
quently in First Amendment law. The First Amendment embodies complex 
normative questions involving the value of free expression and political dis-
course.194 It is hard to locate a single value or proxy test to stand in for the 
“exposition of ideas,”195 the protection of “political dissent,”196 “the ad-
vancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,”197 and all of the 
other values served by the freedom of speech.198 Moreover, the blank slates 
covered by intermediate scrutiny and related balancing tests tend to be broad, 
encompassing, for example, all instances of commercial speech or all non-
content based speech regulations. In situations like these, balancing is likely 
to be the optimal decision-making regime and effective proxy values will be 
difficult to find. 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress “to regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States.”199 In the landmark cases of Gibbons v. 
Ogden and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Supreme Court found 
that the states cannot interfere with Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 791–99. 
 193 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 194 E.g., Blocher, supra note 167, at 393–97. 
 195 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that “fighting words” do 
not implicate the core First Amendment value of promoting the exposition of ideas). 
 196 Blocher, supra note 167, at 396 (summarizing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992)). 
 197 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing the core values inherent in the 
concepts of the freedom of speech and freedom of the press). 
 198 See, e.g., 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774) (noting the value of 
press freedom of expression lies “in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of 
Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promo-
tion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more hon-
ourable and just modes of conducting affairs”); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 784–86 (1987) (noting that the First Amendment also advances democratic values and pro-
tects individual autonomy). 
 199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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commerce.200 The Commerce Clause has power even “in its dormant state,” 
and this dormant Commerce Clause prevents the states from usurping Con-
gress’s commerce powers.201 
To be clear, the question of the dormant Commerce Clause’s existence is 
not a blank slate. Textualism gives a clear answer: it does not exist.202 History 
and intent may also provide useful guidance, though authorities are split on 
the issue.203 As far as precedent, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
dormant Commerce Clause for nearly two hundred years, and the first prece-
dents were written by Chief Justice Marshall himself.204 The question is dis-
puted, but the slate is far from blank.   
For our purposes, suffice it to say that the dormant Commerce Clause is 
well-established law that continues to limit state power today.205 Neverthe-
less, at least initially, courts lacked guidance as to the scope and content of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.206 In other words, the law was unclear as to ex-
actly when a state violated the dormant Commerce Clause by unlawfully in-
fringing on Congress’s powers. There was, of course, no textual or drafting 
evidence on the issue, and the Supreme Court’s foundational precedents did 
not address the matter either.207 A blank slate arose. 
The Supreme Court initially struggled to establish a test for determining 
when a state law violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court took its 
first steps in Cooley v. Board of Warrens, noting that some subjects are “in 
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regula-
tion,”208 and these subjects “require exclusive legislation by Congress.”209 
The Court did not, however, explain what these subjects might be or how to 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 200 (1824). 
 201 See Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252. 
 202 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause has no textual basis in the 
Constitution and is impractical in reality). In addition, the question of whether the dormant Com-
merce Clause exists is a binary question that does not call for a test, as blank slates do. 
 203 Compare Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 39–40 
(2006) (contending that ample historical foundation exists to support the dormant Commerce 
Clause), with Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264–65 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the Framers almost 
certainly did not intend to create a dormant Commerce Clause). 
 204 Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 186. 
 205 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008). 
 206 See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Con-
stitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 577. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
 209 Id. 
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identify them, but instead confined its opinion to the precise question of laws 
regarding boat pilots.210 Cooley stated a principle but did not promulgate a 
workable test.211 
In the decades after Cooley, the Court was likewise unable to establish a 
concrete test, and the rationales of its cases were often inconsistent with one 
another.212 Some cases incorporated elements of balancing, considering 
whether state regulations served a legitimate purpose without unreasonably 
burdening interstate commerce.213 Others looked to vague, undefined stand-
ards like whether a state regulation was a “direct” or “indirect” burden on 
interstate commerce.214 Ultimately, the “direct burden” standard could not 
withstand criticism from dissenting Justices215 and scholars,216 and the Court 
dropped it in favor of directly balancing the efficacy of a state law against the 
“national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences.”217 
In modern cases, facially neutral state regulations are evaluated under the 
Pike balancing test, under which such regulations “will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”218 
The scope and content of the dormant Commerce Clause was a para-
digmatic blank slate, a legal question on which there was no direct history or 
intent and no text at all. The Court struggled for over a century to elaborate a 
test for determining whether a state regulation violated the dormant Com-
                                                                                                                           
 210 Id. at 320. 
 211 See id. 
 212 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 11.6(a) (2d ed. 2016). 
 213 See, e.g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902) (upholding a Colorado statute that 
required a license for bringing certain cattle likely to carry disease into the state); R.R. Co. v. 
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470–72 (1877) (striking down a Missouri statute that barred bringing cattle 
from Texas, Mexico, or Indian lands into the state); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 
(1875) (overturning a California statute requiring ship owners to pay a bond for certain passengers 
they bring to California). 
 214 See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (striking down a state statute that 
required a license to sell steamship tickets or orders on the grounds that it burdened foreign com-
merce). 
 215 Id. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting) (contending that inquiring as to the directness of the state’s 
interference with commerce is too mechanical and removed from reality to be particularly useful). 
 216 See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(1940) (arguing that the direct vs. indirect burden test was indeterminate and led to inconsistent 
results). 
 217 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775–76 (1945). 
 218 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). State laws that overtly discriminate 
against interstate commerce will be struck down “unless the discrimination is demonstrably justi-
fied by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,” a standard analogous to strict scrutiny. 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 
(1986)). 
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merce Clause. It repeatedly failed to develop a workable proxy standard and 
ultimately adopted a balancing test that expressly weighs local benefits 
against the harms imposed on interstate commerce. The adoption of a balanc-
ing approach was perhaps less inevitable here than in First Amendment law. 
The normative considerations underlying the dormant Commerce Clause—
which include the efficiency benefits of uniform federal regulation of inter-
state trade, the informational and democratic benefits of allowing states to 
regulate intrastate commerce, and the difficulty for Congress of policing eve-
ry state infringement on interstate commerce219—are largely practical and not 
as complex or as varied as those behind the First Amendment. The blank slate 
here, however, is broad, potentially encompassing all state regulations that 
affect interstate commerce. It is also likely that courts will have access to 
high-quality information relevant to the normative questions surrounding 
state regulations that affect interstate commerce. The federal government, the 
states, and affected industry groups will frequently be parties or amici in 
dormant Commerce Clause litigation and can provide courts with information 
on the purported benefits of state regulations and the potential impacts on 
interstate trade. Moreover, the Court attempted to create proxy standards sev-
eral times, and those proxies failed for lack of coherence and administrabil-
ity.220 In these circumstances, the direct normative balancing adopted by the 
Court was probably the optimal approach. 
C. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment 
1. Text and Context 
a. “Searches” 
The text of the Fourth Amendment reads, in full: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.221 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1981); Henkin, supra 
note 33, at 1041. 
 220 See Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37 (setting forth a test based on the directness of the state’s bur-
den on foreign commerce); Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319 (stating that inherently national 
subjects require exclusive legislation by Congress). 
 221 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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The Amendment plainly applies to “searches.”222 But what does “search” 
mean here? The term is not defined in the text, and in general it has several 
possible meanings.223 A “search” might be an abstract inquiry, like the 
“search [for] truth.”224 It might be any act of “seeking”225 or “looking for”226 
something, as in searching for a place to eat. Alternatively, it could refer to 
the close “examination”227 of a thing, like searching through a letter for a par-
ticular phrase.228 Or, a search could refer to the physical act of inspecting a 
particular space,229 as in “to search the house for a book.”230 
Yet the term “searches” is not just ambiguous in the abstract. In the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment, it is almost wholly indeterminate. From the 
earliest days of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the text and structure of the Fourth Amendment to mean that rea-
sonable searches typically require a warrant and probable cause.231 Even the 
exceptions to this rule generally require at least some quantum of suspi-
cion.232 Thus the question of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search is 
a crucial one. Searches usually require probable cause, whereas the police can 
engage in non-searches without any suspicion or any meaningful limits on the 
extent or duration of their investigation.233 But the term “searches” gives no 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Id. 
 223 Kerr, supra note 75, at 70. 
 224 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828). 
 225 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. 1792); 14 J.A. 
SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 804 (James A. H. Murray et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1989). 
 226 NATHAN BAILEY, A UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1783). 
 227 JOHNSON, supra note 225; SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 225, at 804–05. 
 228 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 225, at 804; Kerr, supra note 75, at 70. 
 229 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 225, at 804–05. 
 230 WEBSTER, supra note 224, at 66. One of several definitions provided by Johnson cites the 
poet John Milton and refers to search as “[i]nquiry by looking into every suspected place.” JOHN-
SON, supra note 225. 
 231 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (holding that the search of the 
contents of a cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and 
therefore required a warrant); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (ruling that the 
search of Weeks’s house and seizure of his letters required a warrant), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that letters sent through 
the mail can only be opened and examined pursuant to a warrant). In practice, the warrant re-
quirement is subject to numerous exceptions, and courts now evaluate some government searches 
against a pure reasonableness standard. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117–19 
(2001) (upholding a warrantless search of a parolee’s apartment); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (upholding a warrantless search of an automobile). 
 232 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (permitting police officers to engage in limited 
seizures of suspects based on reasonable suspicion). 
 233 The history of “non-search” surveillance is rife with examples of abuse and excessive moni-
toring of citizens. See generally ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, 
INFORMERS, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1992) (detailing some of the FBI’s surveillance activities 
 
2018] Blank Slates 629 
indication of how courts should draw the line between a search and a non-
search in this context. 
Scholars have generally acknowledged that the scope of the term 
“search” is not apparent from the text.234 One exception is Akhil Amar, who 
has suggested that a “search” should be construed broadly, covering any act 
of looking at something or any gathering of information.235 But Amar does 
not address the alternative definitions of “search” or offer any evidence to 
support choosing the expansive definition.236 More importantly for our pur-
poses, Amar’s interpretation does not answer the core question presented in 
most Fourth Amendment scope cases: when can the government obtain in-
formation on an individual when it lacks any grounds to suspect her of a 
crime? Under Amar’s approach, the government could search a person with-
out suspicion if doing so were “reasonable,” but reasonableness is an amor-
phous, “common-sense” concept that provides no direct formal guidance.237 
Amar’s approach would merely relocate the blank slate from the “search” 
component of the Fourth Amendment to its “reasonableness” component. 
                                                                                                                           
and discussing examples of excessive monitoring of citizens and other abuses of “non-search” sur-
veillance); Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY 
(May 11, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm [https://
perma.cc/37UU-H6VA] (discussing how the NSA has been amassing the phone records of tens of 
millions of Americans as part of its anti-terrorism efforts). 
 234 See Kerr, supra note 75, at 70 (“The ambiguity of the word ensures that a wide range of 
concepts might plausibly define the meaning of searches.”); David Alan Sklansky, Two More 
Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234 (2015) 
(“One can perhaps extract from this language the traditional rule exempting searches of open 
fields from constitutional protection, but not much else.”); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 
77, at 27 (“Indeed, it is hard to see how the Court could resolve the issues it regularly confronts 
through a purely textual approach. For example, ‘search’ and ‘seizure’ are hardly self-defining. 
Although one can debate whether ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ gives them appropriate 
content, there can be no dispute that the Court had to look outside the text to give them mean-
ing.”). 
 235 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 769, 811 
(1994). David Gray makes a similar argument in DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017). 
 236 See Amar, supra note 235, at 759. This may be because the scope of “search” is not the 
focus of his Fourth Amendment interpretation; the main thrust of his argument is that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require or favor the use of warrants, but only mandates that searches be 
generally reasonable. Id. Amar also concedes that his definition of search would give the Fourth 
Amendment enormous scope, subjecting huge quantities of government action to potential judicial 
scrutiny and swallowing up the entirety of substantive due process law and parts of equal protec-
tion. Id. at 811. 
 237 Id. at 801 (proposing a substantive test for reasonableness based on what “[c]ommon sense 
tells us”). Amar also notes that, because the Justices have generally required a warrant and/or 
probable cause for most Fourth Amendment searches, they “have spent surprisingly little time 
self-consciously reflecting on what, exactly, makes for a substantively unreasonable search or 
seizure.” Id. 
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Moreover, Amar’s approach would require eliminating the warrant re-
quirement as a default rule.238 It is unnecessary here to evaluate whether elim-
inating the warrant requirement would be normatively desirable.239 Suffice it 
to say that the rule has been at the heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
since its inception,240 and so long as it exists, an extremely broad reading of 
“search” is unworkable. The scope of the “search” concept remains a mys-
tery, especially in the context of a body of law that favors warrants and suspi-
cion before the police can search. 
b. “Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects” 
The Fourth Amendment protects people’s right to be secure in their 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”241 These categories are fairly capa-
cious, but can be read as providing at least some textual limits on the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment. Things not listed in this clause may be ineligible for 
Fourth Amendment protection, in accord with the traditional canon of con-
struction expressio unius.242 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See id. at 761 (proposing eliminating the warrant requirement). 
 239 Unlike the Katz test for Fourth Amendment scope, the warrant requirement has not come 
under widespread scholarly attack. Instead, many scholars have lamented its erosion by exceptions 
and “special needs” cases. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: 
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991) (arguing for a revival of 
the warrant clause consistent with actual law enforcement practices); Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth 
Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scruti-
ny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 531 (1997) (proposing the use of strict scrutiny to resusci-
tate the warrant requirement); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in 
Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 89 (1992) (arguing that the special 
needs rationale fails to further the Fourth Amendment’s purpose by overweighing governmental 
goals at the expense of privacy). There is also a robust debate over whether the Fourth Amend-
ment’s ambiguous history supports or undermines the warrant requirement. Compare WILLIAM J. 
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at lxvi 
(2009) (noting that “specific warrants were mandatory and were intended to be the conventional 
method of search and seizure”), Davies, supra note 77, at 738 (expressing that a warrant require-
ment more closely approximates the unrecoverable original intent), and Laura K. Donohue, The 
Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2016) (stating that “reasonable” 
searches and seizures usually require warrants because warrantless searches and seizures would 
have typically violated the common law), with TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 46–47 (1969) (arguing that a requirement that searches be accompanied 
by warrants was not the original understanding nor evidenced anywhere in the Fourth Amend-
ment’s history), and Amar, supra note 235, at 761–71 (contending that history indicates no war-
rant requirement). 
 240 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393; Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
 241 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 242 “Expressio unius est esclusio alterius,” that is, “the express mention of one thing excludes 
all others,” generally means that a list of items excludes similar items not listed. Expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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This was the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Olmstead v. United 
States, a 1928 case where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to conversations because they were not material things like “papers” or 
“effects.”243 The Court overruled Olmstead in 1967, concluding that the 
Fourth Amendment could apply to intangible things.244 The Olmstead ap-
proach has virtually no defenders today, even among originalists.245 Instead, 
the clause is generally interpreted to be illustrative, providing examples of 
things that are protected by the Fourth Amendment rather than strictly limit-
ing its coverage.246 
Moreover, even if the Olmstead interpretation were adopted, the Fourth 
Amendment’s text would still offer no formal guidance to courts in a huge 
portion of cases. There are myriad difficult questions of scope involving per-
sons (facial recognition programs, CCTV or satellite monitoring), houses (in-
frared scanners,247 drug-sniffing dogs,248 drone and airplane surveillance249), 
“papers” (emails,250 text messages,251 instant messages), and effects (cell 
phone tracking,252 automobile GPS tracking,253 license plate monitoring). 
Courts will find no answers to these questions in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                                           
 243 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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REV. 581, 583 (2011). 
 247 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
 248 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3 (2013). 
 249 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986). 
 250 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 251 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010). 
 252 In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 253 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012). 
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2. History and Purpose 
There is very little direct historical evidence relating to the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.254 Indeed, the Founding-era history of the Fourth 
Amendment as a whole is sparse and ambiguous.255 Although conjectures can 
be made about its general historical meaning, there is virtually no clear guid-
ance for courts trying to determine when the Fourth Amendment applies. 
Indeed, there are remarkably few Founding-era statements on the Fourth 
Amendment by framers or legislators, and virtually none concerning the 
Amendment’s scope. There was no discussion of a search and seizure provi-
sion at the Constitutional Convention.256 The subsequent debate over a poten-
tial bill of rights “rarely involved delving into the details of an enumeration of 
a bill of rights,” but focused instead on the general need for rights protec-
tions.257 The few, isolated references to protection against searches and sei-
zures were “themselves vague assertions, consisting of little more than a 
phrase or a sentence or two.”258 These generally raised concerns about the use 
of general warrants, the potentially unlimited powers of government officials, 
and the protection of the home.259 
James Madison initially drafted the Fourth Amendment, which resem-
bled in structure Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
a provision drafted by John Adams.260 Madison gave no explanation of the 
Amendment beyond an intent to deter general warrants,261 and there is no 
record of any commentary by Adams on the Massachusetts search and seizure 
provision.262 The Fourth Amendment generated virtually no recorded debate 
in Congress.263 State records regarding the ratification of the Amendment re-
veal that “[n]one of [the state legislative] journals preserves a single utterance 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 75, at 70–72 (describing the ambiguous historical context of 
Fourth Amendment searches). 
 255 See TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 43 (“Nothing in the legislative or other history of the 
fourth amendment sheds much light on the purpose of [its] first clause.”); Clancy, supra note 162, 
at 983 (finding that “there is no consensus regarding the details or meaning of the historical rec-
ord”); Davies, supra note 77, at 551 (noting that “the participants in the historical controversies 
that stimulated the framing of the Fourth Amendment simply did not discuss when a warrant was 
required”); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 77, at 78 (noting that “at least in the fourth 
amendment context, the words, structure, and history do not yield a determinate outcome”) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 256 Clancy, supra note 162, at 1029. 
 257 Id. at 1032. 
 258 Id.  
 259 Id. at 1033. 
 260 Id. at 1027, 1044. 
 261 Id. at 1045–46. 
 262 Id. at 1028. 
 263 Id. at 1047, 1051. 
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by a state legislator on the right respecting search and seizure.”264 The silence 
is daunting. 
Likewise, the broader Founding-era history surrounding the Fourth 
Amendment provides virtually no useful guidance to courts deciding cases 
involving the Fourth Amendment’s scope. The most influential part of that 
history involves a series of abuses by King George III and his officers that 
raised concerns in the Colonies about unreasonable searches and seizures.265 
In the early 1760s, English officers empowered by general warrants entered 
and searched the homes of citizens suspected of libel against the King.266 The 
homeowners sued for trespass and won substantial damage awards.267 
These cases suggest that a government official entering one’s home, 
looking around inside, and going through one’s belongings was the paradig-
matic Fourth Amendment search.268 This comports with the text and drafting 
history of the Amendment, both of which reflect a concern with general war-
rants and the inspection of private homes.269 
Today, the idea that the physical inspection of a house by government 
officials is a search is uncontroversial. It is the clearest possible example of a 
search, one end of a vast spectrum ranging from obvious searches to obvious 
non-searches. The home search scenario provides little guidance to a court 
trying to determine whether some other type of government activity is a 
search. As one Fourth Amendment scholar has noted, “[e]xamples alone can-
not identify how far beyond their facts the principle should extend.”270 
Nor is there doctrinal or historical support for limiting the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope to trespasses alone. Indeed, it appears that no jurist or 
scholar advocates such an approach.271 To be sure, the pre-Founding cases 
                                                                                                                           
 264 CUDDIHY, supra note 239, at 713 (“To the extent that the direct evidence indicates, the 
amendment’s ratifiers took their thoughts about its original meaning to the grave.”). 
 265 Kerr, supra note 75, at 70. 
 266 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.), in 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 
1029 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (K.B.). 
 267 Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1036 (awarding 300 pounds in damages); Wilkes, 98 
Eng. Rep. at 499 (awarding 1000 pounds in damages); see Amar, supra note 235, at 798, 814 
(discussing punitive damages in early trespass cases). 
 268 Kerr, supra note 75, at 72. 
 269 Incidentally, there is no clear Founding-era evidence that physical inspections of vehicles 
or chattels outside the home were Fourth Amendment searches, and the first Congress authorized 
suspicionless inspections of certain vehicles and non-residential buildings. See, e.g., Lawrence 
Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism in Constitutional Adjudication 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 42) (on file with author). 
 270 Kerr, supra note 75, at 73. 
 271 Cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (employing a trespass-like concept but noting that Katz would 
continue to govern non-physical searches involving electronic signals); Amar, supra note 235, at 
769, 811 (advocating a trespass-like remedy for Fourth Amendment violations but also a broad 
interpretation of search that covers intangible as well as tangible things); Sacharoff, supra note 
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involved real property trespass actions and most Founding-era searches 
would have required physical intrusion as most nonphysical means of surveil-
lance had not yet been invented.272 But there is no evidence that the Framers 
intended to limit the concept of searches to only those contexts that common-
ly arose in 1791, or that the contemporary remedy of trespass liability was 
meant to somehow limit the extent of searches.273 Moreover, there is little 
basis for arguing that “searches” should be read to include only the specific 
searches that existed at the time of ratification. The Supreme Court emphati-
cally rejected a similar argument regarding “arms” in the Second Amend-
ment: 
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, 
that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are 
protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret 
constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment 
protects modern forms of communications, . . . and the 
Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, . . . 
the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instru-
ments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were 
not in existence at the time of the founding.274 
As the Supreme Court itself notes, the same can be said of searches that did 
not exist at the time of the founding.275 
None of this is to say that trespass concepts should never be a part of 
Fourth Amendment law,276 or that history cannot serve as an inspiration for 
new proposals in this area.277 The point is simply that history itself gives us 
little concrete guidance in determining what exactly is and is not a Fourth 
Amendment search. It can inspire us, but it does not compel us. 
                                                                                                                           
245, at 882 (proposing a trespass-based approach to the Fourth Amendment’s scope in addition to 
a separate privacy-based test). 
 272 Also, subpoenas for documents in criminal proceedings were unheard of in the pre-
Founding-era, and were generally rejected in civil proceedings as well. See Entick, 19 Howell’s 
State Trials at 1073 (“There is no process against papers in civil causes . . . . It has often been tried 
[though] . . . [i]n the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of.”). 
 273 See Kerr, supra note 75, at 74–76; Sacharoff, supra note 245, at 898. 
 274 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
 275 Id. 
 276 See Sacharoff, supra note 245, at 882–83 (arguing that trespass concepts should be incor-
porated into existing Fourth Amendment scope law). 
 277 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 235, at 797, 814–16 (advocating various new institutions for 
regulating law enforcement, inspired by his historical analysis, including a “Fourth Amendment 
Fund” to educate Americans about the Amendment, attorney’s fees awards for successful plain-
tiffs, and citizen review panels overseen by administrative agencies). 
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Thus, beyond the uncontroversial principles that the physical inspection 
of a house is a search and that general warrants are unlawful, the lessons of 
history tend to be very broad and abstract.278 The bedrock purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment was to protect privacy, property, and liberty from undue 
intrusions by government officers.279 This purpose is reflected in the Framers’ 
rejection of general and invalid warrants, which were the primary means of 
authorizing intrusions in an era before professionalized police forces or laws 
against resisting law enforcement officers.280 How this general purpose 
should manifest in individual cases, however, remains unclear. 
3. Past and Present Fourth Amendment Tests 
In the early days of the republic, the Fourth Amendment rarely came up 
in reported cases.281 Early Fourth Amendment search cases generally invoked 
property,282 privacy,283 or both.284 There was not yet any conflict between 
these two concepts. That changed in Olmstead, where the Court held that the 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1707, 1746 (1996). 
 279 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] 
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property 
. . . .”); CUDDIHY, supra note 239, at 766 (“Privacy was the bedrock concern of the amendment, 
not general warrants.”); Cloud, supra note 278, at 1726 (noting that “the historical record suggests 
that objections to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about 
protecting privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions”); Davies, 
supra note 77, at 744–45 (arguing that “it is certainly the case that the Framers intended to pre-
serve a personal and domestic sphere that would be meaningfully protected against undue intru-
sions by government officers”). 
 280 Davies, supra note 77, at 552, 554, 620, 623–27 (discussing how particularized warrants 
were an effective means of restraining Founding-era law-enforcement officers and describing how 
the context and practice of law enforcement has radically changed since the Founding). 
 281 Id. at 613. The Fourth Amendment was not held to apply to the states until 1949. See Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police is part of the Due Process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
 282 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (finding the Coast Guard did not 
search a boat when they visually observed its decks from a distance and did not physically explore 
the boat). 
 283 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (“The Fourth Amendment for-
bids every search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of priva-
cy.”). 
 284 See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918) (discussing Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment principles and noting that all of them involved “force or threats or trespass upon property 
[or] some invasion of privacy”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (discussing intrusions on both property and 
the “privacies of life”). 
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government could record telephone conversations so long as they did not 
physically intrude on constitutionally protected forms of property.285 
The consequences of Olmstead were ruinous for privacy and citizen se-
curity, as the government used its largely unfettered wiretapping power to 
monitor a vast array of private conversations and to threaten disfavored polit-
ical groups and civil rights leaders.286 Eventually, the failures of Olmstead’s 
property-focused approach led the Supreme Court to replace the property re-
gime with a new Fourth Amendment test.287 Under the Katz test, if the gov-
ernment violates people’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,”288—defined 
in various cases by reference to concepts like probability,289 social norms,290 
existing law,291 or normative considerations292—then it has engaged in a 
search.293 The Katz test is a proxy test, meaning that courts applying it use 
citizens’ expectations of privacy as a proxy for the underlying balance be-
tween the competing values of privacy and the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment. 
The Katz test has been the dominant test since 1967, although the Court 
recently supplemented the test in a pair of cases involving tangible proper-
ty.294 These cases added a “physical touching” test, under which certain types 
of physical intrusion onto property are also considered Fourth Amendment 
searches, even if they would not otherwise be searches under the Katz test.295 
In these cases, the physical touching without permission of a citizen’s proper-
ty, no matter how minimal, is used as a proxy standard that determines the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope.296 
                                                                                                                           
 285 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. 
 286 See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 212, at 583. 
 287 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 288 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (upholding a suspicionless search of a citizen’s fields). 
 289 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that a police officer’s 
tactile examination of the outside of a bag was a Fourth Amendment search); Kerr, supra note 4, 
at 508–12.  
 290 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (holding that an overnight guest has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the home where he is staying). 
 291 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding that the observation of a suspect’s 
backyard from a helicopter was not a Fourth Amendment search). 
 292 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984) (ruling that a prisoner has no reason-
able expectation of privacy in his prison cell). 
 293 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. See generally Kerr, supra note 4, at 507–22 (describing four dif-
ferent models for analyzing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for purposes of a 
Fourth Amendment search). 
 294 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7–10 (holding that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on the curtilage of a 
house was a Fourth Amendment search); Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (ruling that the attachment of 
a GPS device to the underside of a car was a Fourth Amendment search). 
 295 See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7–10. 
 296 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court’s approach to the blank slate of Fourth 
Amendment scope has been to adopt various proxy tests: first, physical tres-
passes on property,297 then reasonable expectations of privacy,298 and now a 
test that encompasses both reasonable expectations and physical touching for 
information-gathering purposes.299 
It is debatable whether a proxy approach was the optimal strategy for 
developing a Fourth Amendment test, given the complexity of the issues sur-
rounding government surveillance and personal privacy, and the tendency of 
new technologies to destabilize Fourth Amendment law. The Katz test has 
been emphatically and almost universally criticized.300 Critics have called it 
incoherent,301 unpredictable,302 tautological,303 and unhelpful in practice,304 
among numerous other things.305 The recent, property-based sub-test is un-
likely to substantially improve the Katz regime. It mirrors pre-Katz prece-
dents that were widely viewed as pernicious or arbitrary306 and were largely 
repudiated in Katz itself.307 The sub-test has also proven to be vague, confus-
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 303 Etzioni, supra note 301, at 413; see Baude & Stern, supra note 113, at 1824–25. 
 304 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for a strict 
theory of Fourth Amendment standing and critiquing the lack of constraint on judges imposed by 
the Katz test); see Solove, supra note 301, at 1522–24 (2010). 
 305 See generally Etzioni, supra note 301 (discussing additional flaws in the Katz regime in-
cluding its underprotectiveness, its susceptibility to influence by powerful institutions, and its lack 
of suitability for the internet era). 
 306 See, e.g., Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 
357–59 (1966) (citing several such critiques). 
 307 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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ing, and capable of generating significant line-drawing problems.308 The re-
peated failures of various proxy standards to provide a coherent and effective 
test reflect the difficulty of fashioning a proxy that can effectively capture the 
complex balance that underlies the concept of Fourth Amendment search. 
Section IV.A below further explores the potential implications of blank slate 
theory for Fourth Amendment law.309 
D. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
As discussed, blank slates may arise when courts are called upon to de-
fine an important term or phrase used in a previous decision. A notable exam-
ple can be found in sexual harassment law. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, the Supreme Court ruled that sexual harassment constituted discrimi-
nation on the basis of an individual’s sex under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.310 Further, the Court held that sexual harassment encompassed not only 
harassment linked to an economic quid pro quo, but also harassment creating 
a hostile work environment.311 Yet the Court did not explain how lower courts 
should determine what makes a work environment hostile.312 Nor is the con-
cept of a hostile work environment self-defining or obvious, except in the 
more extreme cases of workplace harassment.313 
Courts applying Meritor thus lacked a test to guide them in assessing a 
potentially hostile work environment. Nor was there any statutory text ad-
dressing the concept of a hostile environment or anything helpful in the mea-
ger legislative history on sex-based discrimination.314 In the subsequent case 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court created such a test, writing on an 
essentially blank slate.315 Harris established a broad proxy standard, one that 
                                                                                                                           
 308 George M. Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to 
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 310 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
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looks to all relevant circumstances and specifies several important but non-
exhaustive factors, including: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere of-
fensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 
work performance.”316 The Court also required that the employee subjective-
ly perceive the environment as abusive.317 It rejected a stricter standard that 
would have required a showing of a serious impact on an employee’s psycho-
logical well-being.318 
The Court in Harris could have used a direct balancing approach, 
weighing the various harms to the employee against the potential chilling of 
non-harassing speech or excessive liability for minor incidents of rudeness. 
But here, the blank slate was fairly narrow, fact-based, and not especially 
complex.319 A proxy test is therefore likely to be more effective in this con-
text. Indeed, a simpler proxy standard might have been equally effective and 
easier to apply than the capacious, multi-factor standard the Court chose.320 In 
any event, Harris provides a useful example of a blank slate that was optimal-
ly addressed by a proxy standard rather than direct normative balancing. 
E. Detention During a Police Search 
Courts addressing blank slates may choose to adopt proxy rules instead 
of proxy standards. The choice between rules and standards is a complex one 
with its own rich scholarly literature.321 In this context, proxy rules are likely 
to be most effective for relatively narrow blank slates, especially when nor-
mative considerations tend to strongly favor only one outcome.322 In such 
situations, a rule will frequently yield the correct outcome while lowering 
decision costs, meaning that both error costs and decision costs will be low. 
The law of detention during searches provides one example of a court 
using a proxy rule to stand in for a fairly one-sided normative balance. In 
                                                                                                                           
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (discussing racial discrimination cases involving non-economic, hostile 
environment harassment). 
 316 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
 317 Id. at 21. 
 318 See id. 
 319 Further, the underlying normative considerations likely tilted in favor of a harassment-free 
workplace, and a lopsided normative balance can contribute to simplicity. 
 320 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating for a standard that fo-
cuses on “whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s 
work performance” and explaining that “[t]o show such interference, the plaintiff need not prove 
that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 321 See supra notes 148–161 and accompanying text. 
 322 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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1981, in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court addressed when, if ever, 
the police may detain an occupant of a home while they carry out a search 
pursuant to a valid search warrant.323 Although the text and history of the 
Fourth Amendment usually provide some guidance for courts assessing 
Fourth Amendment seizures, the issue of detention during a home search was 
unique because it fell within a conceptual gap created by modern Supreme 
Court precedents. 
Before the 1960s, numerous precedents had established that seizures re-
quired probable cause, a requirement that “was treated as absolute.”324 But in 
Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that police officers could perform some limited 
seizures with less than probable cause, so long as they met the standard of 
reasonable suspicion.325 In several other cases, the Court evaluated certain 
searches and seizures using a reasonableness balancing inquiry, often allow-
ing the police to search or seize with no suspicion at all.326 It was indetermi-
nate which line of precedents courts should apply to the unique question of 
when the police may detain a house’s occupant while carrying out a valid 
search warrant. Nor was there any direct formal guidance as to whether the 
existence of a search warrant could help to justify a seizure.327 
The Court in Summers recognized the normative balance underlying the 
question of detention during a house search. Indeed, it overtly weighed the 
competing considerations.328 On one side, there was a significant intrusion on 
the liberty of the persons detained, although the Court found that this intru-
sion was less intrusive than the search itself, and did not carry the stigma of 
an arrest on public streets.329 Further, the risk of abuse was mitigated because 
any such detention would only occur incident to the execution of a search 
warrant approved by a neutral magistrate.330 On the other side of the balanc-
ing test were several benefits: preventing the occupant from fleeing if incrim-
inating evidence was found, minimizing the risk of harm to officers, and po-
                                                                                                                           
 323 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981). 
 324 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (holding that taking a citizen into custo-
dy and transporting him to a police station for interrogation without probable cause was an unrea-
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 325 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22. 
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tentially avoiding property damage by securing the help of the occupant in 
opening locked doors or containers.331 The balance of interests tilted in the 
government’s favor, and accordingly, the Court created a categorical rule that 
“a warrant to search for contraband . . . implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to detain the occupants of the premises.”332 
The Court thus adopted a proxy rule to stand in for the normative bal-
ance underlying the question of detention incident to a search warrant. It ex-
pressly declined to establish a balancing test.333 The Court also rejected sev-
eral competing proxy standards. The dissent suggested that a seizure incident 
to a search warrant would only be justified if the police had specific and ar-
ticulable facts demonstrating a reasonable risk of physical harm.334 The Unit-
ed States filed an amicus brief arguing that the appropriate standard should 
ultimately be a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.335 The Court, how-
ever, declined to adopt these, instead preferring a more workable, bright-line 
rule that did not require officers to evaluate the quantum of suspicion.336 
A proxy value is likely to be effective in this context. Indeed, the Sum-
mers rule generates no particular controversy and was recently reaffirmed by 
the Supreme Court.337 The legal question of Summers was narrow, involving 
a fairly straightforward normative balance that favored one side. There were 
several proxies that might have effectively reflected this balance. The Court 
plausibly concluded that a categorical rule would produce better outcomes 
over time than the standards favored by the federal government or the dissent-
ing justices. 
This section has examined how courts have addressed a variety of blank 
slate situations. It has drawn lessons from these examples and demonstrated 
how blank slate theory can help explain the outcomes and doctrines of these 
important cases. Part IV applies these lessons to broader debates about legal 
interpretation, as well as to the specific context of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                                                                                           
 331 See id. at 702–03. 
 332 Id. at 705. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF BLANK SLATE THEORY 
This Part examines some of the implications of blank slate theory.338 It 
starts by examining how the theory can be used to help courts create effective 
legal tests in areas where existing tests are working poorly.339 It then discuss-
es how blank slate theory can inform broader debates about legal interpreta-
tion and how it can augment both formalist and non-formalist interpretive 
theories.340 The last section examines the temporal element of legal develop-
ment, exploring how the decision-making regimes discussed in Part II are 
likely to change over time and describing how blank slate theory can contrib-
ute to the growing literature on rulification and legal change.341 
A. Evaluating and Replacing Existing Legal Tests 
Blank slate theory can help courts confront blank slates, whether in 
common law cases of first impression or other contexts. It is also helpful in 
analyzing existing tests and proposing new tests. In situations where formal 
sources of law are largely silent, precedents may eventually accrue, filling in 
the blank slate and providing a foundation of formal law to guide future 
courts. But courts are not infallible, and addressing blank slates can be diffi-
cult. Often, the tests created by precedent will be substantially flawed or at 
least subject to serious critique on various grounds.342 
The analysis developed above can be used to evaluate courts’ existing 
approaches to particular blank slates. And it can bolster—or undermine—
proposals in favor of new legal tests. Accordingly, if current law employs a 
balancing test where a proxy is likely to be more effective, or vice versa, that 
may be a powerful argument in favor of doctrinal change. 
This Section uses the example of the Fourth Amendment’s scope, where 
existing tests have been severely criticized, to show how blank slate theory 
can provide theoretical support for a substantial legal change. The theory can 
help improve Fourth Amendment law, pointing towards an optimal regime for 
determining scope and helping to explain why previous approaches like the 
Katz test have been so unsuccessful. A similar exercise might be performed 
with any of the blank slates identified above or any other blank slates that 
arise as courts confront new legal questions for which existing formal sources 
give minimal guidance. 
                                                                                                                           
 338 See infra notes 342–392 and accompanying text. 
 339 See infra notes 342–367 and accompanying text. 
 340 See infra notes 368–382 and accompanying text. 
 341 See infra notes 383–392 and accompanying text. 
 342 See supra notes 300–308 and accompanying text. 
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1. Choosing a Legal Regime for Fourth Amendment Search 
Imagine that judges are considering replacing the current Katz-led re-
gime for determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps they are 
convinced by the legion of Katz critics and the numerous flaws they have 
identified in the current regime.343 They look to formal sources of law like 
text, history, and purpose, but those sources are essentially silent on the rele-
vant questions.344 Blank slate theory can help determine the optimal approach 
to formulating a new test. Generally speaking, courts might choose either a 
direct balancing or proxy value test, and blank slate theory can assist courts in 
systematically evaluating this choice. 
The first step would be to assess the likelihood that a proxy value could 
capture the general normative balance of Fourth Amendment search. This 
balance has been identified, at least in broad terms, in the Fourth Amendment 
case law and literature: it is the balance between the benefits of improved law 
enforcement on the one hand and the harms to civilian privacy and security 
on the other.345 
Although this abstract balance is easy to identify, each side raises com-
plex issues that may be difficult to capture with a simple proxy value. How 
law enforcement benefits from certain types of surveillance will often be con-
text-dependent, could vary based on the availability of alternative methods, 
and is inherently probabilistic, as many searches will not yield any evidence 
or benefit to law enforcement. Many of the benefits of crime detection are 
themselves complicated, such as the deterrent effect and the net benefit to 
society of incapacitating the guilty via imprisonment.346 On the other side, 
harms to privacy from government activity are multifaceted and often poorly 
understood.347 
Moreover, the technological and social context of government surveil-
lance is particularly unstable.348 Technological advances like the telephone, 
recording devices, and the internet have repeatedly destabilized surveillance 
                                                                                                                           
 343 See supra notes 300–308 and accompanying text. 
 344 See supra notes 189–268 and accompanying text. 
 345 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (describing such a balance in the 
prison context); Amsterdam, supra note 300, at 403 (describing the balancing underlying the 
Fourth Amendment and Katz as ultimately requiring a value judgment); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilib-
rium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 526 (2011) (describ-
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 346 See Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 591, 599 (2016) (mapping the public costs and benefits of investigation in probabilistic 
terms). 
 347 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478–82 
(2006) (describing the complexity and the multivalent nature of the legal concept of privacy). 
 348 See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. 
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law and policy by making possible new types of government searches and 
creating new threats to personal privacy. Emerging technologies and changes 
to social practices and norms will likely cause similar disruptions in the fu-
ture. 
Finally, Fourth Amendment search is a broad legal concept covering a 
wide variety of government and private activities. Government surveillance 
activities alone can range from asking questions of a person on the street, to 
subpoenaing a suspect’s bank records, to using spy satellites to constantly 
monitor large numbers of people. 
All of these considerations suggest that it will be difficult to ever find an 
effective proxy test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Because the norma-
tive calculus underlying Fourth Amendment search is complex, any proxy 
value is likely to leave out important normative considerations. The relative 
instability of the government surveillance context is likely to undermine any 
proxy test. And it will be difficult to forge a proxy regime to effectively ad-
dress the broad variety of questions that arise under the concept of Fourth 
Amendment search. 
It is also important to consider how much easier a Fourth Amendment 
proxy test would be to administer compared to a direct balancing approach. 
Ease of administration will vary depending on the proxy being considered. 
For example, several scholars have proposed a positive law regime as a proxy 
approach for Fourth Amendment searches.349 Under a positive law regime, 
government action is a Fourth Amendment search if the action is a tort or vio-
lates some other law.350 A positive law regime would likely be easier to ad-
minister than a direct balancing approach because in many cases, government 
actions will clearly be either lawful (operating a helicopter in compliance 
with aviation regulations) or unlawful (going through a person’s trash in vio-
lation of a local ordinance). A positive law approach will not be easy to apply 
in all cases, however, because it will frequently be indeterminate. Privacy 
torts and trespass laws often turn on “reasonableness” standards that are no 
more concrete than the vague standards of Fourth Amendment law.351 Fur-
thermore, private parties rarely litigate many types of issues that arise in sur-
veillance cases, such as those involving drug-sniffing dogs or CCTV camer-
                                                                                                                           
 349 See Baude & Stern, supra note 113, at 1837–50; Michael Mannheimer, The Contingent 
Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1284–87 (2015) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
should be interpreted in terms of the applicable state’s search and seizure rules). 
 350 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 191. 
 351 See Re, supra note 136, at 320. 
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as.352 The administrability benefits of a positive law regime are real, but not 
nearly as substantial as they initially appear. 
Finally, it is useful to consider how likely it is that courts will be able to 
obtain the information necessary for normative balancing in the Fourth 
Amendment context. It may be difficult to find useful information on harms 
to citizens’ privacy, as these harms are hard to quantify and there are relative-
ly few studies on the concrete psychological and social harms of privacy in-
vasions.353 The government is reasonably well situated to offer useful infor-
mation about the benefits of a particular search technique to law enforcement, 
but in frontier cases, such information will often be conjectural or reflect only 
limited police use of such a technique. 
Nevertheless, useful information on privacy harms and law enforcement 
activity has become increasingly available in recent years. Legal scholars 
have begun the difficult work of quantifying privacy harms and some relevant 
psychological studies have been conducted.354 Courts are increasingly able to 
gather, in their own digital records and databases, systemic facts about police 
behavior.355 Moreover, some harms related to police searches are easier to 
quantify than privacy harms, such as the harms caused by police coercion, 
harassment, or the threat of force.356 The information relevant to a direct 
normative balancing test would be somewhat difficult for courts to obtain, but 
the difficulty is gradually diminishing, and there are already several sources 
of useful information available to courts. 
Overall, the considerations discussed in this section suggest that a direct 
normative balancing test would be the optimal approach to the blank slate of 
Fourth Amendment search. Every factor suggests a low likelihood that a 
proxy value will ever be able to adequately capture the Fourth Amendment’s 
normative balance. A proxy that does not encompass fundamental normative 
                                                                                                                           
 352 Id. 
 353 Cf. John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Kolb, Electronic Performance Monitoring and Social 
Context: Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 339, 339–40 (1995) (finding 
that monitored workers experienced increased stress relative to non-monitored workers); Carl 
Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for Predicting Panoptic Ef-
fects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 309–10 (1996) (finding that workers under surveillance 
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 354 See, e.g., Aiello & Kolb, supra note 353, at 339; Botan, supra note 353, at 307–10; Chris-
topher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 
335 (2008) (setting out the average perceived intrusiveness of various types of searches); Daniel J. 
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 355 See Crespo, supra note 142, at 2070–86. 
 356 William Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1065–66 (1995). 
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values—a “leaky” proxy—is likely to generate large error costs that dwarf 
any administrability benefits. For instance, a leaky proxy is likely to decide 
important cases on the basis of almost wholly irrelevant considerations.357 
In addition, the administrability benefits of a positive law regime, the 
best-known proxy alternative, are likely not substantial enough to risk the use 
of a leaky proxy.358 The difficulty of obtaining information relevant to norma-
tive balancing does weigh slightly in favor of a proxy alternative. However, 
this difficulty is typically the least determinative factor, and relevant infor-
mation is not so scarce as to present a major obstacle to normative balancing. 
Ultimately, Fourth Amendment scope is analogous to issues like the 
scope of the dormant Commerce Clause or the First Amendment’s treatment 
of content-neutral speech regulations. Like the First Amendment, it presents a 
complex normative balance and covers a broad range of situations. Like the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the Fourth Amendment has been subject to sev-
eral proxy rules that have failed because they have been too leaky or too in-
coherent. As in those contexts, balancing is likely to be the best strategy for 
addressing the Fourth Amendment’s blank slate. 
This is not to say that the test for Fourth Amendment scope should inevi-
tably be a balancing test. Some scholar or court may yet devise a proxy that 
captures the normative balance underlying the Fourth Amendment, but none-
theless remains simple and administrable. Nor is this Article elaborating a 
specific test or defending such a test against myriad potential objections—that 
would require another article. This Article’s claim is only that, until an effec-
tive proxy emerges, blank slate theory suggests that some form of balancing 
is likely to be the optimal strategy for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. More-
over, blank slate theory can help us understand and articulate why the Katz 
standard has failed as a Fourth Amendment test. 
2. Understanding the Failures of the Katz Test 
Scholars have extensively documented the flaws in the Katz test and its 
failures to protect privacy in a variety of situations.359 Blank slate theory, 
however, can provide a deeper understanding of precisely why the Katz test 
has produced such poor results. 
                                                                                                                           
 357 For a discussion of this problem in current Fourth Amendment law, see supra note 234 
and accompanying text. 
 358 See Tokson, supra note 144, at 194 (describing how a positive law regime would frequent-
ly lead courts to decide Fourth Amendment cases based on considerations irrelevant to Fourth 
Amendment values). 
 359 See supra notes 281–308 and accompanying text. 
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The Katz test has performed poorly in part because people’s expecta-
tions of privacy are a leaky proxy for the fundamental values underlying 
Fourth Amendment scope. This is reflected in the small but significant num-
ber of cases following Katz that explicitly or implicitly reject expectations of 
privacy as a basis for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. In Smith v. Maryland, 
the Court explained that in certain situations, the Fourth Amendment will ap-
ply even when people lack any expectation of privacy.360 Indeed, Smith overt-
ly acknowledged that the Katz standard leaves out vital normative considera-
tions of freedom and privacy.361 There are also several cases where the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply even when people in general do expect priva-
cy.362 For instance, despite the fact that people in general expect that their 
personal conversations will not be recorded, it is not a search when an under-
cover officer records such conversations.363 Again, Katz’s focus on “actual 
expectations of privacy” leaves out important normative considerations.364 
The failure of the Katz test to capture fundamental normative interests is 
problematic for several reasons. First, despite the cases just described, courts 
have frequently applied the flawed Katz standard and looked to people’s ex-
pectations of privacy when determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope.365 
Lower courts are especially likely to apply the Katz test literally in cases of 
first impression, often reaching normatively questionable results based on 
their assessments of privacy expectations.366 Second, the failure of the Katz 
test to embody fundamental Fourth Amendment values has led courts to ex-
pand and modify Katz haphazardly, creating several conflicting approaches to 
                                                                                                                           
 360 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979). 
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the Fourth Amendment’s scope.367 The resulting mess of precedents and the 
need to choose between multiple models of the Katz test has perplexed courts 
and scholars. This confusion also makes the Katz test difficult and costly to 
administer in cases of first impression, further reducing its value as a proxy 
test. 
Thus, blank slate theory provides a useful perspective on the failures of 
the Katz test. Katz’s “reasonable expectations of privacy” standard is a leaky 
proxy, and it has become very difficult to properly apply. Moreover, its failure 
as a proxy may have been inevitable from the start, given the complexity of 
the normative balance underlying the Fourth Amendment’s scope. The core 
problem is not how courts have interpreted or limited Katz in subsequent cas-
es, but rather the flaws in the very design of the Katz standard. 
B. Lessons for Interpretive Debates 
Blank slate theory can offer a fresh perspective on longstanding debates 
about legal interpretation. Theories of legal interpretation are numerous and 
varied, and disputes between competing theories make up a large proportion 
of legal discourse. Such theories might be categorized in a variety of ways.368 
For present purposes, this Article groups interpretive theories into three cate-
gories, intended to track the major fault lines of interpretive disputes. First are 
formal theories of interpretation, those that interpret law based solely on for-
mal sources like text, history, or precedent.369 Second are extra-formal theo-
ries, which posit that legal sources should be interpreted based on both formal 
sources and external considerations that are nonetheless part of the legal en-
terprise.370 These external considerations might include things like morality 
or the promotion of liberty.371 Finally, there are instrumental theories, which 
posit that interpretation should be conducted by considering the consequences 
of alternative decisions and choosing the best option based upon a particular 
theory like distributive justice, communitarianism, or wealth maximization.372 
                                                                                                                           
 367 Kerr, supra note 4, at 507–22. 
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Under instrumental theories, formal sources are, at most, a source of institu-
tional and rule-of-law benefits to be weighed in the overall calculus.373 
There are vigorous debates between adherents of extra-formal theories 
and instrumental theories,374 and epic disputes between formal theorists and 
those belonging to the other two camps.375 Yet blank slates function largely 
outside of these debates, because they exist only when formal sources offer 
no useful guidance or constraint in interpretation. The unique lessons of blank 
slate theory can suggest improvements and refinements to all three types of 
interpretive theory. For instance, blank slate theory can improve instrumental 
theories (or at least those that care about maximizing utility) by giving them 
some specificity in terms of how to create optimal legal tests. Blank slate the-
ory goes beyond directing courts to seek the holding that will produce the 
best outcome, as it provides specific recommendations for tests depending on 
the characteristics of the underlying situation. Likewise, blank slate theory 
can improve extra-formal theories that encompass policy considerations or 
normative justifications for law. For example, blank slate theory may help 
judges determine which legal test would be the best fit with the normative 
justifications that underlie a particular law.376 
Many formalists have noted that legal gaps might, in theory, arise under 
formal interpretive regimes.377 Blank slate theory can refine formal theories 
of interpretation by identifying particular situations where substantial gaps 
have arisen.378 It can also improve such theories by offering a normatively 
appealing method for resolving such gaps in the absence of useful formal 
guidance. 
Blank slate theory also has implications for situations where formal law 
is underdeterminate but does provide some guidance. Many laws are only 
partially determinate, ruling out several interpretations but still permitting a 
wide variety of potential approaches.379 In these cases, blank slate theory can 
help courts choose between competing constructions of a law and create op-
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timal decision-making regimes. Thus, even if one considers some of the ex-
amples of blank slates discussed above not to be truly blank but merely un-
derdeterminate, blank slate theory can usefully guide courts in either case. 
Judges exercising discretion in resolving underdeterminate legal questions are 
no less in need of a theoretical framework that can help them effectively ad-
dress such questions. 
In situations where formal law is relatively clear, blank slate theory can 
help evaluate existing legal tests. The theory can help instrumentalist deci-
sion-makers weigh the institutional and stability benefits of formal law 
against the costs of applying inefficient tests. Even under more formal ap-
proaches, the theory can help to determine when a statutory test is unworka-
ble and should be amended or repealed, and when courts should overturn or 
narrowly apply a precedent rather than expanding its reach.380 The extreme 
case of blank slates focuses attention on proxy rules and how well they cap-
ture underlying normative values—but even formally compelled rules can be 
evaluated based on similar criteria. Laws are ultimately normative judgments 
made concrete. These judgments are fashioned into rules by legislatures, 
agencies, or higher courts. Courts can honor those judgments by interpreting 
laws correctly. But judges, lawyers, and scholars should not lose sight of the 
normative decisions that underpin the laws, nor should they accept proxy 
rules or standards uncritically even if courts are bound to apply them. 
Thinking about law as a spectrum, ranging from compelling commands 
all the way to blank slates, may actually bolster formal approaches to inter-
pretation. The tendency to treat all legal questions as determinable by formal 
sources can ultimately undermine formalism. It can lead formalists to argue 
for certain outcomes based on conjectural or flimsy formal evidence. Exam-
ples might include the use of far-fetched “textual hooks” to import various 
principles into the Constitution,381 or unwarranted certitude about obscure 
historical facts or intentions.382 Incorporating blank slate theory and applying 
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its lessons in cases where formal sources provide only slight or ambiguous 
guidance can help prevent formal theories from becoming outcome-driven 
and disingenuous in practice. A less totalizing approach to formalism can pre-
serve its role in the vast swath of cases where formal sources really do have 
something to say. 
C. Blank Slates, Timing, and Rulification 
When a court creates a new legal test in response to a blank slate, that 
test is not frozen forever in time, but rather continues to develop and evolve 
as courts apply it in various situations. This section discusses how the modifi-
cation of legal regimes over time interacts with blank slate theory. 
Rulification occurs when courts applying a standard promulgate sub-
rules to address particular situations.383 The overarching standard remains, 
but eventually a large proportion of cases is governed by rules. Higher courts 
may sometimes issue “rules against rulification,” instructing lower courts not 
to rulify a standard when applying it to concrete cases.384 For example, in 
eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court struck down lower court decisions 
that had partially rulified the traditional four-factor standard for issuing per-
manent injunctions.385 The Court made it clear that, going forward, courts 
must apply the standard without any shortcuts, engaging in detailed inquiries 
and tailoring outcomes to the specific facts of each case.386 
Rules against rulification are least desirable when further experimenta-
tion or development in the lower courts is likely to be useful or informa-
tive.387 As lower courts address new cases, they may make broad concepts 
more concrete, gather additional relevant information, and develop particular 
sub-rules to improve a doctrine and ease decision costs.388 Blank slates are, 
by their very nature, legal questions on which there has been little ferment 
and where additional experience and information is likely to be helpful. Ruli-
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fication is thus, in general, likely to be beneficial for both direct normative 
balancing tests and proxy standards in blank slate contexts.389 
Normative balancing tests are especially likely to benefit from rulifica-
tion over time. Balancing tests often have high decision costs that may be 
lowered by rulification.390 They also direct courts to weigh the fundamental 
considerations behind a legal question and give an honest, comprehensive 
account of the basis for their decisions.391 This is a complex task, but repeated 
consideration of a normative question by different decision-makers can yield 
useful insights. Courts can also glean valuable information from repeated bal-
ancing whenever a balance regularly favors one side over another in particu-
lar cases.392 In those contexts, promulgating a rule to govern similar cases is 
likely to produce correct outcomes while lowering decisions costs. Ultimate-
ly, this analysis suggests that the optimal approach to many blank slates will 
be initial balancing that eventually hardens into a set of tailored sub-rules to 
efficiently address particular situations. 
CONCLUSION 
Any constitutional, statutory, or common-law regime will leave gaps 
that judges must fill in the course of resolving disputes. Legal blank slates 
arise when these gaps are too substantial to be resolved with narrow decisions 
and require a more systematic, forward-looking approach. A framework for 
thinking about such gaps has been sorely lacking, in part because blank slates 
have not previously been studied on their own. 
This Article has identified the phenomena of blank slates and provided a 
methodology for addressing them. Its ultimate goal is to help courts avoid the 
historical mistakes made in dormant Commerce Clause and Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, where courts struggled mightily to fashion effective legal 
standards. Indeed, on the complex issue of Fourth Amendment scope, courts 
are still struggling today. This Article has studied this important blank slate in 
detail and offered a new theoretical framework for the concept of Fourth 
Amendment search. 
Blank slates, like those discussed above, are likely to arise with increas-
ing frequency as we move further away from the world in which the Constitu-
tion was drafted. Moreover, in every area of law, societal and technological 
change will continue to present novel legal questions not contemplated by 
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lawmakers or addressed by formal sources. The importance of a systematic 
theory of blank slates is likely to grow even greater over time. 
Finally, blank slate theory offers hope for advancing longstanding and 
seemingly intractable debates about legal interpretation. It considers the de-
terminacy of law as a spectrum and uses the extreme case of blank slates to 
gain new insights into legal interpretation generally. It can augment and refine 
a variety of interpretive theories, lending specificity and substance to non-
formal theories and filling prescriptive gaps in formal ones. Although blank 
slates, like legal gaps in general, are probably inevitable, the failure to address 
blank slates effectively is not. 
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